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ABSTRACT 
"Is Closing the Digital Divide the Answer to Development?" 
The Case of Information Communication Technologies in the Caribbean 
By Vivenne Edward 
Coined the 'digital divide', technology access and its role in development has 
increasingly become an issue of intense debate, as information and communication 
technologies and accessibility are now new additions to existing parameters of 
poverty measurements. Using ICT for development initiatives, like development 
institutions, CARICOM is attempting to reduce poverty by increasing ICT access 
within the region. It is questionable though, whether the inclusion of ICTs in a 
poverty reduction agenda will bring about the desired result. There is a tendency to 
severely overstate the potentialities of ICT for development as the digital divide is 
merely an implicit reflection of existing global inequalities. Ignoring structural 
factors such as excessive migration and skill loss, non- mutually beneficial 
technology transfer agreements and unfair market policies pillared on neoliberal 
capitalistic principles, can only allow Caribbean ICT initatives to serve as an 
ameliorative tool, rather than part of a long term development goal. 
January 7th, 2009 
Saint Mary's University 
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Chapter 1- INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
"The world is witnessing the creation of a new social stratum: the 'technology poor' who 
(for economical, geographical, social, cultural, or political reasons) cannot gain access 
to the emerging technological resources needed to ensure productivity in an increasingly 
digitized global economy" (Rigobert G.T.C, 2006:38). 
Technical progress and transatlantic borrowings, to Phillip Scranton (1995), were 
the fundamentals for the propulsion of the American empire. What Scranton failed to 
note was that beyond the American empire, both technological innovation and 
transatlantic movement, would usher in an era of mass migration, mass capital and 
resource flows becoming known as the age of globalization. Innovations in technology, 
more specifically innovations in information communication technologies (ICTs) have 
facilitated an emergence of a global economy functioning primarily through a 
"connection of [a] vast network of individuals across geographic boundaries at negligible 
cost." (DOI, 2001:5). The transmission of massive amounts of information at 
unprecedented speeds and shrinking communication costs, have now become the 
foundation of new forms of economic activity, the hybridisation of a cosmopolitan 
inspired (global) culture, and the blurring of spatial boundaries. Information 
communication technologies have pedaled developed countries into wealth and economic 
growth unprecedented. 
This explosion of technology has been largely facilitated by the concomitant 
manifestation of "capitalist globalization" or 'neoliberal globalization' (Landsberg, 2006; 
Bowles, 2004). Together globalization and technical progress has created what Ngaire 
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(2000) labels a 'borderless world', which he qualifies as a world in which communication 
technologies allow transnational corporations (TNCs) an omnipresence, that is 
unhindered by regulation and state interventionist policies. This has produced the 
phenomenon of TNCs generating annual revenues far greater than gross national incomes 
(GNI) of several developing countries. Neoliberal globalization as the modus operandi 
of our current global economy, has lent society a period of wealth, yet it has also helped 
produce extreme poverty, famine, climatic and ecological degradation. Society has come 
to accept this paradox, as the consequence of a global capitalist system organized mainly 
under the principles of "[f]ree markets, low tax rates, free trade" and no state intervention 
(US. President Regean quoted in Schulyer, 1988:6). 
The optimism of neoliberal capitalistic ideas has seemingly materialized only in 
the North, while clearly contributing to the deepening and widening of poverty in the 
South, creating an unmistakable division within the world system. This division is also 
evident with regard to technology access and technological innovations and today has 
been aptly coined the "digital divide". While there is a definite disparity with regard, to 
all types of technology access across the world, the focus of late has been with regards to 
ICTs. This is because ICTs have been isolated as having a direct impact on economic 
growth in developed countries (Basu & Frenald, 2006:1). On the other hand ICTs have 
been relatively absent in developing countries. Roger Harris (2004) noted that of the total 
number of computers in the world, developing countries own only four percent, with 
almost 85% of all online users coming from developed countries, representing a mere 
22% of the worlds' total population. The unmistakable presence of large deficits of 
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information flows to the majority of the world has presented itself as a serious 
development challenge. 
Currently several developing states and organizations have felt the need to 
address this with some urgency, prioritizing policy to directly increase digital access 
across the globe, with the hope of bridging the divide. What is clear however is that this 
divide is a "result rather than a cause of poverty and efforts to bridge it must be 
embedded in effective strategies that address the causes of poverty" (Harris, 2004:5). 
Instead, development institutions and developing states need to carefully plan any 
national schemes in order to successfully address this issue. Currently macro level 
discussion fails to recognize that like other material sources of deprivation, the digital 
divide is simply a manifestation of power and wealth imbalances between and within 
nations. Thus it stands to reason that the sound approach to addressing the digital divide 
is to focus on the causes that are both systemic and endemic to the structural reproduction 
of poverty. Unfortunately this is where states have been slowest to act. 
The Caribbean region (for the purpose of the paper the geographic area defined as 
the Caribbean will refer to the Anglophone Caribbean commonly referred to as 
CARICOM) has struggled with development and achieving the modernity that most 
states aspire to.1 Like most developing regions, the Caribbean is experiencing problems 
such as large dependence on agricultural exports on poor terms of trade, and little if any 
negotiating power in the international arena. What makes this region such an interesting 
case is that unlike many other developing countries with low socio- economic indicators, 
the region has achieved relatively well maintained social institutions such as above 
1 Pairing concepts of development and modernity have elicited strong debate, as it is argued that 
they are in synonymous. This is particularly important when reconciling the presence and priority 
of human development versus economic development. 
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average literacy, and would seem the most capable of harnessing the advantages of 
increased digital communications and a stronger technological orientation. The region's 
history with technology though has been tenuous at best. A convergence of endogenous 
and exogenous factors has barred their progress in achieving technological success. 
Like other developing countries striving for entrance into the global information 
economy, governments of the Caribbean region, along with supporting agencies such as 
the UNDP, WB, and ECLAC, have all invested in the implementation of ICT policies, 
and related initiatives in order to incite a regional digital revolution. What many of these 
policies and initiatives fail to reflect is an implicit understanding that ICT integration can 
only be truly integrated into Caribbean society if the policies are accompanied by 
measures to address the problems that caused the lack of access and underutilization of 
technology in the first place. Han Reichgelt (2000) argues that if Caribbean countries 
raise their GDP and subsequendy the incomes of their citizens, persons would be able to 
acquire 'socially desirable goods' such as health care and education and thus increase 
their ability to access ICTs. The simplicity of such an argument belies the complexity of 
the reality. The factors that maintain populations in abject and relative poverty have 
become institutionalized within our economic, political and social way of global 
interaction and would require a drastic reorganization of economic and political behavior. 
Like Reichgelts' 'socially desirable goods', technology will continue to elude the 
Caribbean if the more fundamental issues of underdevelopment are not addressed. 
To this end this research has carefully outlined four of the main factors that 
contribute the structural underdevelopment of technology and ICTs in the Caribbean 
region: 
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• The first is the presence of neoliberal global forces as unfair and growth-
inhibitive in the Caribbean. 
• The second factor present is the non- mutually beneficial and highly restrictive 
technology transfer agreements. 
• The third factor for assessment is the region's antiquated education system that 
has been impacted by socio historical events such as colonialism. 
• Lastly, and quite significandy, the brain drain as a consequence of excessive 
migration, are the most significant contributors to the digital divide in the 
Caribbean region. 
These four factors form the parameters which it would seem has formed 
the very limit with which the region has been able to realize technological 
competencies. This research will draw out each of these factors while also 
speculating the future possibilities for Caribbean technology. My principal 
argument in this thesis is that the so-called "digital divide" cannot be an 
independent, stand-alone cause of underdevelopment, and that, therefore, 
development policies solely aimed at rectifying this divide are bound to fail. 
1.1.2 The Digital Divide 
The value of technology as a driver of economic development has been debated 
for decades as Schumpeter, Marx, Rostow, all theorized that amongst other things, the 
development of science and technology is the most transformative and catalytic agent in a 
society's development. Despite the debate surrounding this issue many scholars do agree 
that".. .economic growth depends predominantly on technological change and cannot 
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occur to any significant extent in its absence" (Usher in Hall, 1986:2). The capabilities of 
ICTs in delivering information in real time, has been an integral part in advancing the 
societies of the North, but have been noticeably absent in the societal fabric of the South. 
Roger Harris, in a 2004 United Nations report on ICTs for poverty alleviation, stated that 
as of 2004 the developing world owned only four percent of the world's computers 
(Harris, 2004:8). He also noted that in 2002 there were only 6.3 million internet 
subscribers within the entire African continent as opposed to 34.3 million subscribers in 
the U.K ; this is particularly worrisome when taking into account what these numbers 
represent as a percentage of the population of their respective region. There is here a clear 
disparity in ICT access. 
Curiously, despite the significant technological innovations that have occurred, in 
many countries the presumed natural growth of development has not appeared. Of the 
177 countries ranked in the 2007/2008 UNDP HDI rankings, 70% of them still ranked 
between the medium and lowest human development which, startlingly, also represents 
almost 80% of the world's population. Moreover, some of these countries, India for 
example, who have introduced ICTs into their economies and become strong participants 
in the information communication revolution, still account for some of the world's 
highest levels of poverty, indicating that the benefits of these innovations have not 
trickled down to the majority of the world's population. 
In fact poverty has abated little in the last decade, according to the World Bank "a 
quarter of the worlds' people [still] remain in severe poverty" (UNDP, 1997: 1). There 
are approximately 2.8 billion people living on less than $2.00 a day and further still, over 
a billion men, women and children who live in abject poverty; that is on less than $1.00 
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U.S a day (Harris 2004)2. That was almost five years ago. More recent world crises such 
as global oil, food price hikes, and steadily increasing inflation, have caused the number 
of people spiraling into hunger and poverty to escalate at an alarming rate. 
Development thinkers are now facing a conundrum so to speak, needing to 
eradicate poverty using a global economic system that seems to perpetuate it. They are 
now seeking new ways of reducing poverty while also steering developing societies to a 
point where they can function fully in the 'information age'. States recognize that in 
order to become competitive and economically viable in the current conditions of the 
global trading system, developing countries are compelled to integrate ICTs into their 
societies. Therefore what is now emerging from the UNDP, UNESCO, World Bank and 
other major development institutions is the discourse that not only should we attempt to 
close the digital gap but we should also include ICTs in the national poverty reduction 
strategies of developing nations. 
In particular one of their focus areas is"[p] pro-poor ICT policies and the 
integration of ICTs into poverty reduction and strategies related to the Millennium 
Development Goals" (UNDP). International financial institutions (IFIs) such as the WB 
and IMF, all subscribe to the orthodoxy that development will occur through 
modernization; thus developing countries should pursue policies that encourage the 
modernization process and by extension a reduction in poverty. This strategy has already 
been applied to many regions such as Eastern Europe, Africa, and Latin America, all with 
varying degrees of success. One criterion of success is that ICTs will have created jobs 
2 There are many statistical, variations of the actual number of people in severe poverty. In 2006 
the world population data sheet (World Bank Publication) reported that actually 3.4 billion people 
live below $2.00 a day. Discrepancies aside, neither half nor nearly half of the world's population 
by any means should be living in such conditions. 
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and incomes, which in turn lead to skill development and an improvement in the lives of 
persons. The UNDP has laid out a five pronged strategy which would allow developing 
countries to integrate ICTs in national development strategies, "promote citizen 
participation and government transparency, capacity development through strategy 
implementation, and [create] bottom-up ICTD initiatives to support civil society and 
SMMEs" (UNDP, 2007) and lastly support of the ICT and pro poor initiative through 
well developed national awareness and stakeholder campaigns. Their hope along with 
those of the supporters of this new ICT for development concept is such that "these new 
technologies will lead to healthier lives, greater social freedoms, increased knowledge 
and more productive livelihoods" (UNDP, 2001:1). 
The idea of using ICTs for poverty reduction however is still problematic and 
must be analysed carefully, as there is a tendency to overstate its potentialities and 
underestimate other contributing factors to the global poverty problem. It has become 
easy to aggrandize the use of technology and proclaim it as a panacea for development. 
Information and communication technologies, however, cannot be applied in a vacuum; 
instead they must operate and be integrated, alongside certain other factors such as basic 
literacy, health and stable physical infrastructure. With that said, it is still questionable 
whether the introduction of information technologies alone can ameliorate the lives of 
those who are facing the burden of absolute poverty. Quite frankly we must question 
whether the aforementioned 1.2 billion people living in abject poverty, who are not 
meeting their basic survival needs, can harness the capabilities of ICTs for sustainable 
socioeconomic development. This question is addressed within the 2008 ECLAC report 
on the Information Society, where it was determined that states must essentially 
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deliberate as to whether they should create policies that would encompass "development 
of ICTs" or "development with ICTs". In other words this would call for states and 
development institutes to carefully analyse whether the application of ICTs in 
impoverished societies is an end in itself or should be focused on as a means to bring 
about development. So far the two concepts have become lost in much of the rhetoric and 
policies that have already been created. The presence of qualifiers such as 'so- called' 
with reference to the digital divide, is evidence of the growing skepticism that an absence 
of digital technologies in impoverished societies should be placed high on the hierarchy 
of needs to be addressed. 
Institutions are tempted to use indicators such as physical access to 
communication technologies and telecommunication infrastructure such as networks and 
internet connections, as the measures for mapping the closure of the 'digital gap', which 
are undoubtedly important and relevant. However we must also place critical importance 
on the quality of the networks being provided. Although difficult to measure, we must 
also allow that the quality of ICT usage has to be qualified before proclamations can be 
made about the closing of the digital divide. The provision of ICTs cannot in alone 
constitute a closing of the digital divide, particularly when complimentary skills and 
services are absent. Other components such as a sound social infrastructure must also be 
developed well enough to support the integration of transplanted technologies. 
This then leads to a question of sustainability. For example the integration of ICTs 
in rural communities has been implemented with varying degrees of success. Success as 
one can imagine is highly relative to the donor organization, the NGO and the 
communities or persons receiving these ICT programs. These programs require steady 
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financial support, in addition to committed qualified personnel to ensure the ICTs are 
being implemented correctly and to provide maintenance where necessary. Most 
importantly sustainability is dependent on the success of the integration of ICTs into 
communities. When weighing all these factors, one must question the viability of ICT for 
poverty alleviation initiatives, particularly as much of the resources from these initiatives 
are highly contingent on external factors. Despite this call for caution what countries 
must be even more cognizant of is that the lack of technology access within their 
societies is generally indicative of a lack of other socioeconomic factors which need to be 
addressed. States should not seek ICT implementation for the sake of it but instead 
acknowledge that implicitly the acquisition of technology should come with conscious 
investments in the socio economic infrastructure of their society. 
1.2 The Caribbean and the Digital Divide 
"The end of the 1980s finds the Commonwealth Caribbean countries very severely tested 
by the changes taking place in the international economy and by the technological wave 
that has been a major factor in the widening gap between developed and ... developing 
countries''' (Ralph Henry, 1991: 37). 
The Caribbean region seems particularly pertinent to this discussion because of its 
struggle to successfully engage in the knowledge economy. Concerns over the 
Caribbean's inability to develop science and technology have been amplified as 
globalization, (and ensuing information age) has made technological advancement and its 
application necessary for survival. The small size of these island states, coupled with 
their lack of natural resources and susceptibility to natural disasters leaves the region 
heavily reliant on its biggest asset, its people. Koelher and Segal (1997) noted that this 
dependence on its people has necessitated a drive to produce a well developed human 
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resource adept at technological capabilities and innovations that would become the 
impetus for social and economic development. This drive however "is proving to be 
agonizingly slow" (p.605). 
From the perspective of the 'digital poverty camp' these island territories would 
unquestionably be considered digitally poor. Both CARICOM and most Latin American 
states have been struggling to close the digital gap within their societies with varying 
degrees of success. For example Saint Lucia, one of CARICOM's smaller island member 
states has developed a telecommunications industry that has been rated as one of the best 
in the region. According to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), their 
telecommunications industry, stimulated by the mobile phone companies have enjoyed an 
83% market penetration with over a 135, 000 users in a population of 160,000. On the 
other hand, they also noted that this IT growth has remained relatively isolated from other 
market segments and has not spilled over into other sectors of the society. Although 
mobile telephone services are relatively well dispersed, other forms of information and 
communication technologies, such as internet service and use are still not widely 
accessible. 
This reinforces the notion that technology as useful as it is in boosting 
productivity, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for socio-economic development 
(Basu & Fernald, 2006:1). Technology can remain highly isolated within sectoral use and 
not flow over into other aspects of society. Other factors must be present to enhance and 
maximize the benefits of technological innovations. For the Caribbean region, the 
impediments to technology access are structural and rooted in the systems of economic 
and political activity. Lack of technology access (particularly internet and computer 
11 
access) should be viewed as a symptom of much larger problems. While we can identify 
several problems that contribute to the digital divide in the Caribbean, it is important to 
isolate the four most significant contributing factors. Within this research we trace the 
effects of neoliberal globalization, technology transfer and the TRIPS agreements, 
Education and the Brain Drain as a consequence of rapid migration as the principal 
factors that are both, structural and systemic and at the crux of the digital access 
phenomenon. While all the factors interrelate, they will be treated as individual 
phenomenon to allow a deeper understanding of their role in the digital divide. 
1.3 Objective of the Study 
This research stems from a discomfort with the assumption that a) globalization has 
brought with it a new phenomenon of disparity in technology access called the digital 
divide and b) that a healthy response to closing the digital divide is to equip poor people 
and rural communities with ICT access. The central argument is that neither of these 
assumptions can be considered as independent causes of underdevelopment. The 
Caribbean as a developing region falls on the side of the divide that generally does not 
have access to technology. Yet there are relatively high social indicators and basic social 
infrastructure such as education and literacy rates that would make this region aptly 
poised for strategic ICT policies. Not only has technology been absent from Caribbean 
society, national policies and strategies thus far have not figured technology as a strategy 
for future economic activity. 
In light of this, this research comprises two objectives. The first is to critically assess 
the digital divide debate. By tracing the fundamental theoretical ascriptions of this 
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argument this thesis will show that the economic drivers of this phenomenon are based on 
modernization and neoliberal politics, both of which have determined the mode in which 
we conduct socio economic and political activity globally, but have also been identified 
as having largely negative effects on the global society. By placing an overemphasis on 
the acquisition of ICTs without a holistic approach of the development needs of 
individual societies (particularly ICTs), states will not find ICTs successful or useful in 
achieving substantive levels of development. 
As lack of technology access is indicative of far more than income levels, and is 
beyond simple economic implications. In fact several socio political and cultural factors 
have become pertinent to this concept. The second objective of this research therefore is 
to advance the view that while there are irrefutably huge differences in the access and use 
of ICTs across the globe, these differences in access and use are a reflection of systemic 
problems resulting from both specific exogenous and endogenous factors, neither of 
which CARICOM can exert control. This is critical, as many scholars have tried to 
account for lack of ICT access through explanations of other divides, such as gender, skill 
and education, income and age. This research asserts that these 'divides' all stem from 
similar factors. Bridging these divides should entail an effort to remove the structural 
barriers that allow them to persist in the first place. 
This thesis will isolate and classify the four most pertinent factors to this research, 
which will be divided into two categories, exogenous and endogenous. The exogenous 
factors are neoliberal globalization as a function of contemporary global economic 
activity and the issuance of technology transfers and the Trade Related Intellectual 
Property and Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIPS&TRIMS) agreements, both of 
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which are highly contingent upon international actors. They are both intensely related but 
independently create circumstances detrimental to technology access and contribute to 
the digital divide within CARICOM. 
The first endogenous factor, the educational system, is critical as this is the crux 
of both a society's ability to create technological innovations as well as harness any latent 
benefits. CARICOM states have an education system that is founded on the legacies of 
colonialism, colonial principles of elitism, highly focused on law and humanities and not 
on science and technology. An analysis of this is crucial to understanding the lack of 
cultivation of a technology oriented society in CARICOM. Lastly this thesis will isolate 
the brain drain as the final endogenous factor, which presents a constraint to the 
technology access in CARICOM. The high rate of emigration of skilled workers to 
metropolitan countries leaving over worked and undersupplied skilled labour, as well as 
the loss of the capacity to create services an industry that could lead to technology and 
socio economic development. 
This research accepts that in reality these factors move between fluid boundaries 
of cause and effect, all having indistinguishable influences on the other. The demarcation 
of these factors within this research is for organizational purposes only. It must also be 
noted that this research accepts that there are other factors that will to a lesser extent play 
a role in the lack of access to technology and the digital divide in the CARICOM region. 
It is important therefore to reiterate that this thesis is going to show that the 
aforementioned four structural factors are the most significant contributors to 
CARICOMs digital divide and serve as the most pertinent inhibitors in the lack of 
technology access. 
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1.4 Thesis Statement 
It is clear that the aforementioned issues play a critical role in current development 
discussions. If they remain unaddressed these issues limit the opportunities of developing 
countries in fully realisng their technological potential and continue to allow developed 
countries to retain their hegemonic position with regard to innovations in ICTs. In light of 
this, this research will address three main areas of knowledge deficit. 
• This thesis will argue that the 'digital divide' as it is commonly known, is 
reflective of larger socio economic and political inequalities, therefore, any policy 
created to bridge this divide should reflect a congruent approach in stemming 
these inequalities as opposed to a primary focus of increased ICT access. 
• Secondly it will axgue that given the relatively high levels of human development, 
the CARICOM region can benefit from holistic policies aimed at increasing 
technological innovation, research and development, in order to increase local 
technological orientation. 
• Thirdly as theorists continue to debate what the central problems are in attaining 
technology access in the Caribbean region; this thesis will argue that in the case 
CARICOM there are four main factors, neoliberal policies, Technology transfer 
agreements, Education and the Brain Drain, that most closely contribute to the 
disparity in digital access in the CARICOM region. 
This thesis identifies that these factors are both structural and systemic, requiring policy 





To answer the research question and advance the areas of knowledge as 
established within the objectives of this research, a qualitative methodological approach 
has been used. This allowed the data collected to be analyzed and assessed with 
satisfactory depth and comprehension. To avoid confusion with regard to the 
geographical area of study, this research relied on the definition of the Caribbean as the 
group of countries forming CARICOM. These countries consist of Antigua and Barbuda, 
The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Montserrat, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, 
Trinidad and Tobago and Associated members Anguilla - 4 July 1999, Bermuda - 2 July 
2003, British Virgin Islands - 2 July 1991, Cayman Islands -15 May 2002, Turks and 
Caicos Islands - 2 July 1991. With the exception of Suriname and Haiti, all other states 
within this grouping represent the Anglophone Caribbean and all are members of the 
British Commonwealth. This definition allowed for easy access to information and 
English documents as well as an analysis of states with relatively similar histories. 
The definition of the 'digital divide' was taken from the ECLAC/CEPAL 
organization as 
"technical systems that receive manipulate and process information and facilitate 
communication between at least two parties. ICTs are therefore more than just 
informatics and computers, since they do not operate as isolated systems but are instead 
embedded into a network. They are also more than just broadcasting technologies..., but 
also permit interactive communication." (ECLAC, 2001:3). 
This definition was chosen because it provided the most comprehensive definition 
of ICTs. This research did not want to concentrate on individual types of technologies per 
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say, but instead wanted to focus on the general lack of technologies and access to them in 
the CARICOM region. Although there is a strong reference to internet and internet based 
access, it is not the only types of technology access focused in this research. This 
definition was also the most satisfactory because other definitions attempted to 
incorporate the 'effective usage' of ICTs as a parameter for measurement; however this 
would be problematic in this research as effectiveness would be difficult to evaluate. 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical structure of this thesis relies heavily on mainstream neoliberalism, 
modernization theory and data to account for the increasing prioritization of technology 
within current economic systems. This thesis consulted several journal articles, and 
books, on globalization as well as world human and economic development statistics 
from the World Bank, UNDP Human Development Reports, journal articles and books. 
Works from the dependency school of thought were consulted to provide a theoretical 
understanding of the current state of development across the Caribbean region. 
The theoretical definitions of technology provided by Cline (1985), Hoselitz 
(1960) clearly identify the social and economic components of a society as a critical base 
to technology production. Therefore analysis of the lack of Caribbean technology access 
required an assessment of those social and economic factors that inhibited the process. 
Four factors were isolated for examination. The four factors chosen were chosen based on 
rigorous analysis of contemporary socio economic and political problems in academic 
literature, journal articles, CARICOM reports and technology assessment reports, 
particularly from ECLAC, World Bank, UNDP and the ITU. 
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Data 
This research is a comparative study of the Caribbean region. I chose to keep the 
study at a regional level because thesis research wanted to show that a) the factors 
affecting technology access were common to almost all CARICOM member states, and 
b) that the similarities in socio economic development, coupled with similar histories, 
emphasized the causality of the factors chosen and that their effects were not just 
incidental but were more deeply entrenched and systemic. 
The data relied upon was sourced primarily from comparative secondary data 
found in journal articles and books, as well as data from institutions such as the World 
Bank and the United Nations. Government documents from specific CARICOM 
countries will also be used in conjunction with CARICOM documents to further support 
and qualify any data drawn from CARICOM reports. 
To show the regional financial constraints in technology investment and 
acquisition, this thesis relied on economic information from CARICOM such as debt 
repayment and GDP for the last 10-15 years in the following tables: 
Table 1 Sectoral Share of Output, 1990 And 2000 
Table 2 Value of Total Imports by CARICOM Countries 
Table 3 Value of Total Domestic Exports By CARICOM Countries 2005 -
2007 
Table 4 CARICOM'S Debt Service Payments as a Percentage of Its GDP at 
Market Prices 1998-2000 
Table 5 CARICOM'S Debt Service Ratio (Debt Service Payments as a 
Percentage of Exports of Goods and Services 1998 - 2000 
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To compare current regional ICT policies, initiatives and progress, this thesis 
relied on data from several secondary sources, represented in the following tables: 
Table 6 Caribbean (Selected Countries): National Strategies for 
Information Societies, January 2008 
Table 7 Select Caribbean ICT Agenda Lead Organizations 
Table 8 Caribbean Information Society Regional Stakeholders 
Table 9 National ICT Budgets 
Table 11 Select Caribbean Countries and ICT Penetration 
Comparative migration data was obtained from international institutions such as 
the UNDP and ECLAC. The information is represented in the following tables and 
figures: 
Table 14 Data on Population And Migration From The 2000 Revision Of 
World Population Prospects. 
Table 15 Caribbean Government's Views and Policies on Emigration, 1996 
and 2000 
Table 16 Percent of Labor Force That Has Migrated to OECD Member 
Countries, 1965-2000 (By level of Schooling) 
Figure 1 Estimated Government Expenditure on Education of Migrants (In 
Percentage of GDP) 
Figure 2 Top 20 Countries in the World with the Highest Emigration Rates, 
1970-2000 (Percent of Educated Labor Force that has Migrated to 
OECD Member Countries) 
Figure 3 Percent of Labor Force that Has Migrated to OECD Member 
Countries 
Caribbean vs. the Rest of the World, 1965-2000 
Figure 4 Percent of Labor Force that Flas Migrated from the Caribbean 
Countries to OECD Member Countries, 1965-2000 
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Data on education such as curriculum, degree granting institutions as well as 
expenditure was represented in the following tables: 
Table 12 Human Development Education Indicators for (Select) Caribbean 
Countries 
Table 13 Caribbean Degree Granting Institutions 
Table 17 Government Expenditure on Education, Average 1999-2002 (Per 
student, as a percent of GDP per capita) 
As much of this debate is relatively recent, much of the documents from the 
World Bank, UNDP, IDRC and UNESCO were within the last ten to fifteen years. 
Although several of the journal articles were recent, there was a fair amount of 
information coming from Caribbean scholars such as, Pantin (1987), Hilbourne and 
Watson (1994), Koehler and Segal (1987) who have been writing on Caribbean 
technology issues since the early 1980s. Their work was invaluable to this research. 
1.6 Thesis Overview 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. This chapter will provide a synoptic view of 
the problem of the digital divide in the Caribbean region and a brief review of the 
conceptual issues surrounding it. This chapter will also provide a clear statement of thesis 
objectives, our central hypothesis, a brief discussion of our methodology and a 
description of the thesis structure. 
The second chapter will be an extensive look at the theoretical constructions that 
frame this research. These theories are fundamental to the general understanding of the 
themes presented, and its relevance to contemporary issues. The four focal points of 
theoretical research will be: technology within the context of growth and development 
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theories, as well as related definitions and terminology; debates on globalization and 
neoliberalism and the positions on the relationship between the current global economic 
system and the proliferation of technologies as an integral factor in its operation; debates 
concerning the TRIPS agreements, followed by an account of the digital divide discourse 
as presented by scholars, states and institutions. This chapter will then review the 
literature and debates, linking the development concepts of technology and development 
to the CARICOM region. There will be a theoretical exploration of 'Dependency Theory' 
as it pertains directly to the economic and social structure of the Caribbean reality. 
The third chapter will be a presentation of comparative empirical data relevant to the 
discussion, while the fourth chapter will provide the analytical discussions based on the 
findings. The fifth and final chapter will bring together our conclusions and final thoughts 
while adding perspectives on future possibilities of technology access and innovation in 
CARICOM. 
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Chapter 2 - TECHNOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Introduction 
"To be certain, globalization is not a random phenomenon but it is in fact a product of 
both technological progress and conscious economic policy" (Benn, 2000:24). 
The technology and development discourse, particularly over the last decade, has 
been discussed in ad nauseum proving no closer to reconciliation on the points of 
discontent. The discontent has so far stemmed from an ascription of necessary 
relationships between technological innovations (ICTs) and its products, and 
socioeconomic development. This is because the 'information technology revolution' as 
Keniston (2004) denotes, was far more remarkable because of the rapid and expansive 
nature of its evolution (p. 11). The ICT revolution under processes of globalization has 
seen the growth of massive wealth and prosperous economies. This wealth accumulation 
is distributed, however, in such an inequitable manner that, according to Kelles-Viitanen 
(2003:82) it currently leaves 1.2 billion people in extreme poverty who are either 
unaffected or reaping only marginal benefits. The deliberate attempts to include ICTs in 
national socioeconomic planning with the explicit purpose of both poverty reduction and 
economic prosperity have raised eyebrows. Although the majority of supra national 
organizations, aid agencies and developed countries view this juxtaposition as completely 
logical and desirable, others view it as oxymoronic and completely competing ideals that 
will serve to perpetuate current inequalities. The objective of this section of the thesis is 
3According to Kenneth Keniston (2004) in his book the IT Experience in India: Bridging the 
Digital Divide, he stated that it took at least a century for the printing press to capture a 50 million 
audience and 38 years for the radio to acquire the same number. The internet, meanwhile has 
achieved that in only four years (p. 11). 
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to provide the critical contributions to the ideas and concepts that surround this complex 
issue. 
This section will first introduce the ideas surrounding technology and address the 
at times confusing terminology in order to provide a definition that is suitable for the 
analysis within this paper. This will be followed by a critical analysis of modernization 
and growth theories from theorists such as Kuznets (1976), Rostow (1960), and Todaro 
(1977), who invariably offered significant contributions to our understanding of the role 
that technology has played and continues to play in our society's attempt to 'develop'. 
This is particularly important because these ideas have not only accounted for the 
'growth through technology' concept that society adheres to but also facilitates its 
continuation and proliferation. 
This will be followed by an analysis on globalization with specific attention 
drawn to the neoliberal ideologies that are driving current globalization processes. This is 
a significant section of the thesis as it will offer insight from theorists such as Harvey 
(2007), Bowles, (2004), on the 'neoliberal globalization' as a driver of the economic and 
technological booms that fuel the current global political economy. This will help situate 
the motivations of states and development agencies who create policies geared at 
becoming highly engaged in technological processes and by extension an economically 
'prosperous' digitized information society. 
This Chapter will provide a general discussion on the digital access (or lack 
thereof) of developing countries and burgeoning digital divide debate, with a holistic 
overview of the particular niceties and concepts. This section will uncover the issues of 
technology transfer and the related international intellectual property rights agreements. 
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The review of this issue is material to this research as it is at the crux of the highly 
inequitable and dependent relationship that developing countries have with the developed 
world, particularly the Caribbean with regard to technology access. The final section will 
offer a recapitulation of the digital divide debate and its relevance to developing societies. 
2.2 Technology and Information Communication Technologies: Working Definition 
"We cannot get on with our work ... even reasonably well until we 'unpack' the word 
technology - take apart the various usages and agree on names for each of the important 
concepts" (Cline, 1985:2). 
Conflicting terminology with regard to technology has incited much debate as 
terms are given and used interchangeably to represent both its processes and products. 
The sheer expansiveness of this issue has called for a narrowing down of definitions and 
concepts This required a delving into the theoretical underpinnings of 'technology' and 
what Cline suggests as a need to 'unpack' the word and remove ambiguity. The main 
objective of this section will be the provision of a deconstruction of a specific type of 
technology; information communication technologies also commonly referred to as ICTs. 
This paper is primarily concerned with providing a general overview of the paradigm that 
will allow a better contextualization of the research issue and allow us to become better 
acquainted with the general concepts. 
In general, ICTs can be classified as a general purpose technology (GPT), e.g. the 
steam engine, waterwheel, internal combustion and electricity (Sadayoshi in Kurihara, 
2008; UNCTAD, 2007; David& Wright, 1999). These technologies are seen as being 
'enabling technologies' or complimentary innovations that boost the productivity of 
existing and potential technology (David& Wright, 1999:7). This definition has been 
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extended from earlier manufacturing products to more recent and abstract capabilities in 
organizing knowledge. It is highly expectant that GPT lead to increases in total factor 
productivity (TFP) and contribute to increasing efficiency in product development. As 
such, ICTs serve infrastructural purposes and further socio economic development. This 
is based on the premise that the creation of networks through ICTs serves as a production 
factor. The development of new ICTs spawns new information, knowledge and education 
which nurture a highly qualified human capital, and eventual 'deepening of other 
resource capital'. This falls in line with neoclassical growth theories that also see 
economic development as consequence of knowledge accumulation. 
Another view presented by Sadayoshi, is that ICTs within development is an 
effective means of communication ICTs provide an easy exchange of information and 
ideas which promotes business and consumption and is also considered social capital. 
Further as an GPT are seen to fundamentally reorganize productivity, ICTs therefore are 
theorized to provide an increasing demand for complimentary services and products, 
which in turn pushes the "demand curve for ICT to shift further and further out, thereby 
offsetting the effects of diminishing returns" (Basu& Fernald, 2006:4). 
Technology as a general concept encompasses much more than the products we 
associate with it. Cline (1985) identifies the four main categories of reference for the term 
technology based on popular usage. While the terms may well present some overlap, 
what Cline attempts to do is highlight how society has internalized different meanings of 
this one concept. He sees our contemporary understanding of technology as products, the 
processes with which we create these products, the knowledge we need to carry out these 
processes and the system within which it all occurs. He deconstructs technology as: 
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• Technology as Hardware: this would umbrella all products manufactured by 
humans. 
• Sociotechnical System of Manufacture: even broader this reference to technology 
is inclusive of all inputs needed to create hardware including the people. It also 
includes social processes such as the legal and economic processes that contribute 
to the technology production. 
• "Rationalized Methodology": Cline isolates the use of technology as meaning 
techniques, methods, knowledge and or the 'know how' (the science behind all 
things). 
• Sociotechnical Systems of Use: this reference Cline denotes is the system with 
which all of the above concepts form and work to create a network that is the 
basis of human accomplishment. 
Again this approach offers a broad view of what we consider to be technology. 
Many scholars have built on this seeing technology not as its parts, but as a sum. It is the 
"totality of methods [that] rest on scientific principles hence their inherently rational 
nature" (Bardouille, 1998:33). Although the extent to which technological innovation has 
been oriented with science has been a perennially disputed issue, Mansfield (1968) agrees 
that there is general consensus that modern industrial society has seen a distinguishable 
positive shift in the translation of science into technological products. As states continue 
to invest in the melding of science and technology, continually the two concepts create 
processes and products that have garnered immense commercial value and subsequent 
economic development. 
This is even truer when focusing on information communication technologies. As 
just one aspect of the technological paradigm, ICTs have been largely instrumental in 
changing how society operates. The significance of the ICT revolution is embedded in a 
principle that is simple and basic. It rests solely on the precept that "all human behavior is 
based on the exchange of information and communication" (ECLAC, 2001:2). By 
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creating and innovating methods to facilitate communication that is cheap and 
instantaneous, states have been able to harness immense commercial value and economic 
development, particularly in developed countries. Defining these technologies however 
has not escaped the dissent that has permeated technology literature. In fact 
understanding of these technologies has become even more difficult in part, due to their 
proletarianization unlike more complex technologies that are restricted to industrial use 
and or use by technocrats, ICTs are more widely dispersed among people and thus 
meanings and interpretations have become easily blurred. According to the ECLAC 2001 
Information Society Report, ICTs are defined as, 
"technical systems that receive manipulate and process information and facilitate 
communication between at least two parties. ICTs are therefore more than just 
informatics and computers, since they do not operate as isolated systems but are instead 
embedded into a network. They are also more than just broadcasting technologies..., but 
also permit interactive communication." (ECLAC, 2001:3). 
They argue that there is a convergence of all of the above capabilities, 
'information disseminating technologies', 'communication enabling technologies', and 
'informatics solutions', than summates what we call ICTs or network(s). ECLACs 
definition of ICTs is the most comprehensive in its acknowledgement that ICTs is really a 
convergence of communication systems and not isolated products. Other institutes 
however have been narrower in their definitions. The World Bank for example view 
information communication technologies in more specific terms referring to ICTs as all 
types of "hardware, software, networks, and media for the collection, storage, processing, 
transmission and presentation of information (voice, data text, images), as well as related 
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services" (World Bank, 2007)4. Although the World Bank's definition of ICTs is possibly 
the most widely used, for the purpose of this paper any reference to ICTs will be based on 
the definition provided in the 2001 ECLAC report. As aforementioned the allowance for 
ICTs as a convergence of systems and not just singular products provides a more 
comprehensive view of an already broad concept. 
While it is not within the scope of this paper to explore the intricacies of how 
these technologies work, it is important to note that that it is in part, the transformation of 
information into codified binary 'digits' that allows the "manipulation of information and 
to communicate between one another" (ECLAC, 2001), hence the "digitization" of media 
or the digital aspect of communication. 
Beyond the use of ICTs, states are now attempting to gain not only the physical 
structures of ICTs but to also become full participants of a knowledge society (also 
referred to as a information society, learning society, or the weightless economy)5. The 
concept of a knowledge society is a primarily economic one. Following the previous 
revolutions of steam and electricity, information has presented itself as the third 
revolution with radio, gramophones, television and computers, the medians that would 
advance the information age (Kumar, 1996). Information society is a construct that has 
been developed to accommodate the growing importance of knowledge and innovation as 
drivers of economic determinism. At its simplest, an information society is a "substantial 
characterization of societies in which information increasingly is the primary means and 
4 For more technical explanations on the workings of ICTs refer to the European Commission 
report on Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament; 
Information and Communication Technologies in Development: the role of ICTs in EC 
development policy (2001). Brussels 14.12.2001; COM (2001) 770 final p;3 
5 It would be impossible to state all the terms that are being used to coin this new phenomenon. 
Therefore any other subsequent reference to this new economic paradigm simply connotates an 
economy based on knowledge and its method of diffusion. 
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product of all processes" (Van Dijk, 2005:132). The set of criteria most agreed upon for 
this type of society is one in which there is "investment in, diffusion and use of modern 
information and communication technologies [ICT] in households and firms, education 
levels and lifelong learning, patents, research, and development [R&D] characteristics 
indices etc. (Robach, 2007:4). 
Scholars such as Djik (2005) cites that there is a difference between a network 
society and an information society which is a "formal characterization emphasizing a 
particular social (infra) structure and organization of contemporary society." (p. 133). 
This 'difference' in terminology however is semantic and has no bearing on the chosen 
definitions of the concept of an information or network society, within this research 
paper; Both terms will be used interchangeably. While societies are always in a 
development flux, inforrnation(al)6 societies either are, or leading to organization of 
systems based on science and rationalization, economic activity based on information 
production, a human resource based on technical education for more complex 
information creating and processing and a culture that has symbolized and placed the 
highest value on information products (Van Dijk 2005). 
However, an information society does not imply a complete reorganization of 
praxis with regard to economic and market principles, as a matter of fact "the imperatives 
of profit, power and control seem as predominant now as they have ever been in the 
history of capitalist industrialism"(Kumar in Van Dijk, 2005:133). Developed countries 
have more closely been identified information as societies because of their high emphasis 
6 Manuel Castells (1996) has argued that because all societies have been based on information 
regardless of form, it is inaccurate to now distinguish our present society as an information 
society. Instead we must denote it as an informational society that now prioritizes the generation, 
processing and transmission of knowledge. 
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on information and its facilitating technologies as economic drivers. These countries, 
particularly those within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), have attained status of post modern, post industrial in which information -
should one make it analogous to a primary good (Van Djik, 2007; Sen, 2001) - has 
become essential to their very survival. This knowledge essentialism has been co opted 
into the language of poverty and inequity development theory particularly that of 
economist Amartya Sen. He argues that information should be seen as a primary good, is 
not distributed equitably across the globe and thus has resulted in information and or 
digital poverty. Moreover Sen argues that individuals and developing countries lack of 
access to ICTs and inability enter into an information society represent the deprivation of 
a basic right. 
2.2.2 Evolution of Technology and Economic Development: Analysis of Growth 
Theories 
"No one has seriously questioned the idea that economic change is driven by the 
introduction and diffusions of innovations either in technique or in organization." 
(Schumpeter in Metcalfe, 1989:54). 
One can hardly discuss the value of technology to contemporary society without a 
brief review of the literature on the history of economic development and growth 
theories. Growth theorists have made significant contributions in accounting for our 
economic development, but more importantly is rooted in (neoclassical) schools of 
thought that has and continues to shape the way most of society organizes and operates. 
The relationship between technology and growth has had its theoretical foundations in 
modernization theory and later neoliberal theory, as symbiotic and necessary in its role in 
society's transformative development. Technology has also played a central role in these 
30 
theories because it is seen rather circularly as a driver of economic growth and a sine qua 
non factor production. The unprecedented rates at which developed societies have been 
achieving economic growth and development, has led to revolutionary innovations in 
technology and an increasing dependence on it. 
More importantly there is a tentative consensus that human beings have moved 
into a "post-" era where technology and information are 'king'. It is no longer adequate to 
contextualize current technology within the economic machinations of society but instead 
we now use the development theories of 'post industrialism' and 'postmodernism' to 
account for societal axioms that are being used to validate techno-essentialism. To frame 
appropriately our future references to technology within society's economic determinism 
it is essential to establish the works of growth theorists who have established a corollary 
between technology and development as well as those who have isolated other factors 
such as the social and political as having a greater catalytic role on growth and 
development. 
Modernization theory evolved from the theories of evolution of Charles Darwin 
and Hubert Spencer and the liberal economic works of Adam Smith (Farmer, 1999:9). 
These theories conceptualize the processes that societies go through from undeveloped to 
modern, industrialized; a process they parallel with individual human evolutionary 
behavior. While there is general consensus amongst theorists that all societies do go 
through a process from the traditional phase to eventually become highly modern, many 
however have offered different perspectives as to the specific course of progression. 
The modernization paradigm is seen as the application of both the "endogenous 
and exogenous dynamic" while some theorists see modernization as a result of purely 
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endogenous factors such as "social differentiation, rationalization and the spread of 
universalism, and achievement..." (Pieters, 2001:43-45), others have also factored in the 
increasing influence of external factors, such as global market trends, increase in 
international trading, the birth of large conglomerates of supranational corporations and 
the creation of global governance in the form of large multilateral and supranational 
organizations. Pieters sees the external factors as coming under the umbrella of 
globalization, imperialism and capitalism. 
The Modernization theoretical approach to growth and development is 
based on the understanding of "a dichotomy between two ideal types: the traditional 
society (...'rural', 'backward' or 'underdeveloped') and the modern society ('urban', 
'developed', and 'industrial'), (Larrain, 1989:87). This concept identifies these two 
societies as polar opposite points which circumvent the development transition. The 
stages in the movement from a traditional society to a modern society are characterized 
by increased complexity in systematic organization, at both the micro and macro level. 
Influential theorists such as Walter Rostow, Micheal Todaro and Simon Kuznets, 
early on identified that it is the development of technology which became the catalytic 
agent in societies' ability to organize and modernise. For Rostow the two most important 
things seen as the basis for his modernization model and resulting societal 
transformation, was technology and economic determinism. He saw the process entailing 
five progressions from a traditional society, then to a society experiencing the 
preconditions of take off, a take off stage, a drive to maturity, then would at last apex at a 
stage of high mass consumption. He argued that any society not able to move beyond a 
traditional phase was because "the potentialities which flow from modern science and 
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technology were either not available or not regularly and systematically applied." 
(Rostow, 1960:4-16). Modernization theorist Micheal Todaro (1977), like Rostow, agreed 
that it was technological progress and capital accumulation that were the main propellers 
of economic development. Though modernization theorists disagree to some extent on 
what the drivers of modernization really were and are, it is still those like Rostow and 
Todaro whose analysis have had the most lasting and influencing effect on contemporary 
thought and behaviour. 
Traditional societies were very unstable with marked fluctuations in 
political and social harmony. Populations were not stable either, and were modified by 
inconsistent harvest output and "incidences of war and plague". Rostow identified these 
societies as pre-Newtonian societies, including early Chinese dynastic society, medieval 
Europe and early Middle Eastern and Mediterranean civilizations. The application of 
science and rational thought was limited and certainly not being used in mass production 
of goods. 
His next stage, preconditions for take off, is traced to a period where "the 
insights of modern science began to be translated into new production functions in both 
agriculture and industry." Britain and the rest of Western Europe have been isolated as 
the societies which first showed initiative in creating the preconditions for take off, 
during the renaissance period of the sixteenth and seventeenth century. In fact (Apter, 
1987) argues that "[m]odernization first occurred in the West through twin processes of 
commercialization and industrialization". Rostow argued that at this stage, education 
became more important and changed to accommodate the demands of new economic 
activity. The most significant feature of this transition, according to Rostow, was the 
33 
creation of a strong, centralized political structure, or, the emergence of a nation state, 
which was necessary for the next stage, take off. 
Continuing on the linear move to development Rostow argued that 
societies increased their individual and national investment and savings over 5% or more 
of their national incomes. Todaro (1977), like Rostow saw the necessity of capital 
accumulation and technological progress as propellers for economic development. This 
stage is also characterized as one of expansion with claims that, industry, urban 
development, technology, expanded almost explosively, along with a support service 
sector to accommodate this expansion. Fruits of this "capital accumulation" are now 
reinvested into "social and economic infrastructure- roads, electricity, water, sanitation, 
communications, etc." At the same time social and political structures continued to 
stabilize and formalize, so as to maintain steady growth: "the vast majority of citizens in 
a democracy to be, must have no doubt, or mental reservations as to which political 
community they belong to." 
Long before Rostow and Todaro's assertions of technology and economic 
growth Marx and Engels in the early twentieth century also theorized the growing 
relevance of technology within then growing industrial society. Much of Marx's work 
was not given due consideration because of the attached eristic political views 
(Rosenburg 1976). That aside however, scholars have had to revisit Marx because of his 
early recognition of technology as "indeed a fundamental factor accounting for the 
growth in resource productivity and man's enlarged capacity to manipulate his natural 
environment for the attainment of human purposes" (p:127). Both Marx and Engels saw 
technological innovation as being borne out of social needs and not necessarily the linear 
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eventual process that Rostow maintained. For Marx and Engels, they saw development 
occurring due to the increase in productive activity that proliferated through the 
innovations of technological processes and products. More importantly this occurred 
under the growing capitalism. Rostow's work entailed similar thoughts particular when 
he detailed society's drive to maturation. As societies tried to become more organized 
and technology became more infused into economic activity growth was "sustained if 
fluctuating". Rostow argued that this period was one of expansion and increasing 
complexity, producing a much wider range of goods before. Societies had even begun to 
organize international economies and were thus able to trade transnationally. 
Modernization theory has also had some major contributions by Hollis B. 
Chenery who examined patterns of development of several developing countries in the 
post-war period. His work in this area included cross-sectional as well as time series 
analysis of countries at different levels of per-capita-income. Chenery highlighted distinct 
markers that indicate these countries transitioning from traditional societies such as a: 
A shift from agriculture to industrial production, a steady accumulation of physical and 
human capital, change in consumer demand, from emphasis on food and basic needs to 
the desire for diverse manufacture goods and services, the growth of cities and urban 
industries, as people migrate from farms and small towns, a decline in family size and 
overall population growth as children lose their economic value and parents substitute 
child quantity for quality. 
Chenery categorized countries according to the developmental stage of their 
industry, such as early industries, middle industries and late industries. Early industries 
were characterized by industries that supplied essential goods to the population, also 
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industries that relied on simple productive technologies and also subscribe to 'Engels 
law' which is that the "share of these industries in GNP rise with the population growth at 
low levels of income, and as GNP grows, the share stops rising, stagnates and then falls. 
Example: food processing plants, textile etc." (Devlin, 2005). Chenery's middle 
industries were all those industries that fall in between the early and the late industries. 
Late industries were all those "whose share in GNP continue to rise even at high levels of 
per capita income. Example: consumer durables, cars, etc."(Devlin, 2005). 
Chenery fell in line with Rostow's view of societal maturation that he viewed as 
synonymously as the age of mass consumption, which was first enjoyed by developed 
societies, such as the United States, Britain and Japan. Classes of skilled workers and 
owners of production dramatically increased, while manufacturing was being centred on 
the production of 'durable consumer goods'. Kuznets agreed that increases in factory 
production and resultant labour productivity increases led to higher growth rates per 
capita. Kuznets acknowledged the conscious adjustment of the market, especially within 
countries seeking supplementary resources to increase production. 
None of these transformations however were happening in isolation but instead 
were juxtaposed with events that (Eisenstadt in Peet and Harwick, 1999) arguably were 
of a high extent of differentiation: the development of free resources which are 
committed to any fixed, ascriptive groups; the development of non traditional, national, 
or even supranational group identifications; and the concomitant development in all 
major institutional spheres, of specialized roles and of special wider regulative or 
allocative mechanisms and organizations.. .(p:76). 
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Growth meant a movement away from the traditional and cultural to embrace 
secularism that encouraged rational thought and the "emergence of an intelligentsia" 
(Peet & Harwick, 1999:77). Eisenstadt felt strongly that as society modernised it became 
more organized, which was critical for its social transition. Kuznets too posited that 
societies also went through a social and ideological change, which was necessary to fully 
embrace growth. 
While modern technology and production became a fundamental part of society, 
society also become concerned with social welfare and the creation of complex social 
systems which indeed saw the birth of the welfare state as the nation state became highly 
effective and democratized. Bert Hoselitz (1960) was one of the strongest proponents of 
stressing the sociological factors of growth and economic development as well as a 
staunch critic of growth theorists who focused primarily on economic determinism. In 
fact he "emphasized cultural change as a precondition for economic development" 
(Hoselitz in Peet & Hartwick 1999:77). Using Parsons' theories, Hoselitz argued that the 
complex (more developed societies) moved beyond 'kinship ascription' as a means of 
distribution of goods and labour. Instead these societies valued individual meritocracy 
which was more efficient and fostered higher levels of productivity. 
Both the economic and social approaches to growth and development, despite 
their differences offer one important similarity. Societies as they changed and 
modernized became more rational and systematic in it organization. Technology has 
flourished in this environment and today is now positively associated with modernization. 
This would be apparent in the balance of scale in terms of economic theorists who lent 
more responsibly to technology for the growth and modernization of society as opposed 
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to social and psychological factors. The above debate is in no way representative of the 
wealth of theories that have been presented to offer an explanation of society's 
development; instead it should serve as a summation of the most critical debates. 
The ensuing presentation of debates will now provide a synoptic view of 
contemporary development debate within the context of globalization and neoliberal 
theory. Globalization as a socio economic paradigm has carried us through an era of 
massive increases in interaction and integration on micro and macro scales. One of the 
most significant by products of this interaction is the development and dispersion of 
information communication technologies. These technologies have profoundly affected 
the lives of billions of people globally with some seeing massive wealth generation while 
others severe poverty. Therefore it is important to review this paradigm to provide a more 
comprehensive if not taxonomic exploration, so as to account for the significance of 
globalization as the driver of technological innovation of a system of that allows such 
inequitably with regard to wealth across the world. 
2.2.3 Beyond Growth Theories Free Markets and Neoliberalism 
Neoliberalism is a central permeating cord of many an ideological clash between 
scholars, states, economists and the global citizenry. This is in part because 
neoliberalism (commonly viewed as a negative agent) has been moving osmotically 
through all aspects our global society, even though as Bowles (2004:2) aptly noted it is 
"primarily an economic concept dedicated to free markets". Its transcendence into the 
socio economic and political fabric of society is arguably cause for concern because of 
the devastating affects it has had on the global society thus far. 
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Neoliberalism can be sourced to the monetarist economics of Friedman who 
decried that inflation and debt was a direct result of government spending, strong 
resistance to the Keynesian economic models in favor of Smith and Ricardian principles 
of a laissez faire economic approach, and lastly the strong influence of individualism and 
conservative views on production and societal organization (Peet & Hartwick ,1999). As 
a response to the 1970s' oil crisis neoliberal policies seemed an optimal choice to combat 
the high inflation and to satisfy the conservative regimes of Regan and Thatcher. 
Neoliberalism is primarily an economic perspective that proposes that economic 
welfare is best achieved through the maximization of free entrepreneurship 
operationalised within the framework of private property rights, individualism, 
unencumbered markets and free trade while the political is relegated to the primary role 
of facilitating this economic activity, (David Harvey, 2007). State intervention must at 
best be given a minimal role in economic activity. The lesser role of polity in neoliberal 
pursuits is precisely one of the points of debate as many argue that the new dynamic of 
neoliberalism coupled with globalization has seen a shift in the role of the state. 
Neoliberal principles were the inspiration for policies such as the International 
Monetary Fund's (IMF) Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs), that many attributed to 
the reversal of fortunes and the "cause rather than the solution to the economic problems" 
of many developing countries (Choussoudosky in Schuurman, 1993:11). The 
foundations of neoliberalism are grounded in modernization theory, and thus trajectories' 
growth and development through the facilitation of modernization, industrialization, 
individualism and most importantly the minimalising of state activity in market 
operations. 
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Despite the argument that neoliberalism is primarily economic, we cannot deny 
the pervasiveness of this mode of thinking and operating within all facets of society, from 
governments, even antithetically opposed states such as communist China, universities, 
(international) financial institutions to name a few. David Harvey (2007) posits that 
neoliberalism has become 'naturalized' and that this naturalization took place because the 
founding fathers of neoliberalism used the values of individual liberty and freedoms "as 
sacrosanct- as the central values of civilization" (p.24). These values have now become 
entrenched and even taken for granted in what we conceive as fundamental to our being. 
2.2.4 Globalization 
"To be certain, globalization is not a random phenomenon but it is in fact a product of 
both technological progress and conscious economic policy." (Benn 2000:24). 
Under the hegemony of neo classical economics, contemporary globalization has 
manifested itself as the movement of "unprecedented global flows in information, 
products, people and capital" (Leye, 2007:2). These flows have also spawned the 
proliferation of technological innovation that thus far has not been enjoyed by any society 
to the magnitude as it is now. This is particularly important when one isolates 
information communication technologies as the most important and arguably the most 
revolutionary of those technologies. The previous discussion presented the core concepts 
of neo-classical theory and laid out the theoretical explanations for the increasing 
prioritization of technology in industry and society. This section will first give an account 
of various theoretical contributions to the meaning as and definitions of globalization. 
This will be followed by a summation of the dynamics of the two processes as they 
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operate in contemporary society. It will also provide an understanding of how this 'new' 
system of operation (neoliberal globalization), has facilitated the increasing use of 
technologies, and the Omni prevalence of information communication technologies 
Deconstructing the concepts that underlie globalization is paramount because as 
Tony McGrew (2001) aptly notes "despite the fact that, in a little over a decade, it has 
colonised the intellectual imagination of the social sciences, it remains for the most part 
largely under- (if not un-) theorised." (p.293). In fact the fundamental problem with the 
globalization argument today Shaw (2000) argues is that "[b]ecause both proponents and 
critics have misunderstood the significance of the global, they have exchanged false 
antinomies, in an increasingly sterile argument". The sterility of this argument is largely 
due to conflicting perspectives with regards to two areas; one globalization as 
intrinsically neoliberal, or as a process operating under the socio economic organization 
of dominant neoliberal ideology. Two, globalization theorists also arrive at an impasse 
when ascribing cost benefit value judgments or attempting to answer the perennial 
question "cui bono?" or 'Who benefits?', (Woods, 2000). Many see the process as 
inherently bad whilst there those who see it as (at least) for the most part as having 
contributed a greater good to our society. 
Globalization is assuredly not a new process. Woods (2000) instead argued that 
to understand this process one had to view the global changes through a quantitative and 
qualitative approach. Quantitatively, he argued globalization meant increases in trade, 
investment, capital movement, and immigration. He implied that on this level 
contemporary globalization is simply an increase in processes that were occurring at least 
a century before. It is through a qualitative analysis that he accounts for profoundly 
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different processes attached to globalization. He viewed the changes as one in which 
people, firms and states identify themselves and manifest their interests differently (p.2). 
An example of this change is the increase in cosmopolitanism and a view of the world as 
a shared territory as opposed to the identifying simply to the national and ethic grouping 
of borders and territories, 
Jan Aarte Scholte (2000) offers a comprehensive account of globalization and 
contextualizes it with respect to the four core processes where it has had the greatest 
influence. Scholte (2000) sees globalization as internationalization because of the 
massive interaction and interdependence of people across the globe. Inexpensive 
communication technologies and the relative ease of cross migration have all facilitated 
this interaction. Globalization as liberalization is yet another factor as this easy and free 
exchange of goods, labor, resources and finances across borders, especially with large 
transnational corporations driving economics and trade. Particularly between countries 
that have even had historically had isolationist policies like China. The third concept, 
globalization as westernization, makes reference to the intensely homogenizing and 
hegemonic effect that western culture has on the consumptive patterns and cultural 
dynamics within the global. Joseph Nye et al.(1999) also equates this process with 
"Americanization". Some argue that globalization creates choice (Clarity 2005), and 
allows people a multicultural view of the world. 
Yet another concept of globalization as 'supraterritoriality' or 'deterritoriality' 
Doucete (2001), has sparked a lot of debate because of its severe political implications. 
Consequently scholars now see governance not just within the spatial constraints of the 
nation state, but instead, have instead have expanded the political imaginary to 
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perspectives that embrace global governance and identities irrespective of territory. The 
development of supranational organizations and corporations, along with the increased 
awareness of issues has elicited collective and certainly borderless responses to global 
issues. Proponents for globalization counter the weakening state argument claiming that 
"nation state, its territoriality, and its sovereignty are not so much eroding as 
transforming" (Perry 2003). 
Proponents of globalization such as Jagdish Baghwati (2004), argues that "the 
perils of globalization happen to be exaggerated because of the .. .fallacies of 
aggregates." (p.6). He postulates that economic globalization is multi dimensional and 
that the discourse has homogenized both pros and cons of globalization as an 
undifferentiated process. Baghwati is of the view that though not perfect globalization is 
an advancement of the human condition and represents half a century of progress. This 
progress he refers to reside in the technological innovations with communication, health, 
transport and manufacturing technologies. "The driving force of what is dubbed 
'globalization' is imputed to the 'revolutionary' consequences of electronic information 
systems that operate across national boundaries."(Petras and Veltmeyer, n.d.:l 1). 
2.2.5 Proliferation of Information Communication Technologies and the Knowledge 
Economy: A Consequence ofNeoliberal Globalization 
Globalization and neoliberafism are seen therefore as conceptually different 
processes. Neoliberalism is seen as a rational policy response by some, enabling the 
benefits of globalization to be spread far and wide. Others view neoliberalism as an 
undesirable response, to be rejected and replaced by new forms of governance so that the 
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potentials of globalization can be realized by those who are currently excluded by the 
neoliberal architecture (Bowles, 2004:10). 
As Bowles notes, though conceptually different, globalization and neoliberalism 
share a symbiotic relationship that is "cohesive, powerful, unavoidable, and tending 
towards integration and uniformity" (Chase, 2002:4). The relationship is such that the 
'neoliberal globalization project' is summarily entrenched in an ideology based on the 
pursuit of economic growth within the complete autonomy of the market which 
neoclassical theorists such as Lai as cited in Hunt (1989) argues that a country's 
"opportunity to trade extends its choice" (p.300), thus subscribing to the principle of 
comparative advantage and legitimization of free international trade. Understanding this 
relationship is critical to how and why we have seen an accretion of ICTs in modern 
society . States are now in an intense pursuit of an information society, as they see this as 
an acute factor to gaining access to and sustaining economic development. 
Globalization in its early forms was not a function of comparative advantage 
principles or the value of private enterprise and government un-involvement, instead it 
took the shape of early colonialism which flourished with the birth of early global trade. 
Capital transfers were at its peak with raw materials flowing unreservedly to the 
metropoles while surplus manufactured goods were sent back to the colonies. The 
Commonwealth Caribbean is a shining example of how capital transfers became the way 
of life for the region. Contemporary globalization however, according to Desai (2001), is 
7 The relationship between technology, globalization and neoliberalism is seemingly circular, 
operating fluidly between integrative processes. Therefore each must be singularly understood 
and deconstructed before elaborating on their combined role in contemporary society. Dennis 
Benn (200) provides a comprehensive account of the workings of this relationship in 
Globalisation and the North South Divide: Power Asymmetries in Contemporary International 
Economic relations. 
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simply "[c]apitalism inks global phase..." (p.l). Ellewood (2002) also supports this view 
that this new type of globalization is not only fostered by laissez faire capitalism or what 
Adam Smith coined as the unrestrained pursuit of individual interests (magic of the 
marketplace), but also the increasing reliance on money and affluence as the criterion for 
success and value. This process is cyclical however, in that as these attitudes that drive 
globalization; the pursuit of technological innovation, deregulated markets, the 
commoditization and homogenization of values and culture, in turn are also fed by the 
beast of growth and profit that globalization has delivered, through the facilitation of 
capital flows that the growth of technological innovations of information and 
communication. 
Phillip Cerny (2000) argues that the rise of the 'competition state' is another 
important consequence of the new dynamic of neoliberal globalization which presents 
itself in three paradoxical manifestations. He argues that within the neoliberal ideology 
the state actor has not declined in its roles as many would argue but instead has been 
redefined in three important areas. This new competition state "necessitates the expansion 
of de facto state intervention and regulation in the name of competitiveness and 
marketization.'Xp.l 17). He suggests that in fact state actors are now even promoting 
globalization and its processes in order to become efficient players. Lastly Cerny sees a 
paradoxical relationship at play between state polity and the globalization process. He 
notes that the values of state/society values and practice conflicts with economic 
globalization. This he argues inhibits states from embodying a "communal solidarity or 
Gemeinschaft" and thus threatens the legitimacy of 'institutionalized power'. Thus the 
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competition state is not only a new form of the state it is also a significant political agent 
in catalyzing political globalization within the confines of neoliberalism. 
This view however is not widely shared; rather both proponents and critics of 
globalization lean more to the view of the decline of the nation state. Petras and 
Veltmeyer lend credence to this view stating that "the nation state has retreated from the 
development process and [has] been replaced by what Robinson conceptualizes as the 
'internationalized state' (Petras and Veltemeyer, 1996: 12). The nation state is an 
historical product, one which is localized in time and space (Amen, 1997:65). This is also 
a critical aspect to our central issue in that countries within the Caribbean and the larger 
south face a loss of power and sovereignty in their already vulnerable position as small 
nation states in the global community. 
Early European conceptions of the nation state provide the foundation for what 
we now understand to a state. The process is ever evolving, allowing us no preconception 
aside from a clear decline in its role as a welfare provider. There is a fundamental 
mismatch between the global scope of markets and the national level at which politics are 
organized (Garret, in Woods, 2000:107). He notes that this incongruence allows 
increasing global market to continue to pressure governments to become competitive in 
its goods and service provision and production, the incorporation of external actors in the 
market process through multinationalization of production, and integration of financial 
markets. Development has become almost synonymous with industrialization and 
technological innovation of production, obliging countries to use outside agents as 
mediums of policy creation thus reducing the autonomy of state led development. 
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There are too, those such as Gilpin (2000), who would see globalization as 
completely reversible. They argue that while globalization is important it is not the sole 
possibility of societal operation and in fact rests upon the very political foundations that it 
is being purported to weaken. Gilpin hypothesizes even further that this political 
foundation could disintegrate if the dominant powers did not strengthen their political ties 
(p.294). While certain innovations such as technology and digital media may be 
irreversible the policies that govern these movements aren't and can thus be as restrictive 
or liberal as states may desire. 
Neoliberal globalization as an agent for improvement in quality of life is more of 
a pseudo-belief because it has caused just as much harm in that same pursuit. For those 
who see it as having greater economic and social benefits argue that the technological 
innovation spurned on by globalization has contributed decidedly more benefits than 
otherwise. Globalization hopeful and economist Martin Wolf (2004), senior divisional 
economist in India in the 1970's, after years of observation of the Indian economy saw 
that post independence India was faced with a stagnant economy and a population "mired 
in hopelessness". Wolf noted that economic progress only resurfaced when the green 
revolution (increased agricultural production through advanced technology) coupled with 
India's transition from a 'pseudo Stalinist control Raj' and incorporation of domestic 
policy on individual, private enterprise and foreign investment. By the year 2000, India's 
GDP had more than doubled. He argues that the adoption of these market policies and 
embracing of globalization saved India from a fate of poverty similar to that of Sub 
Saharan Africa. Wolf also noted that China too experienced over 400% increase in 
income per capita between 1989 and 2000 because of their willingness to embrace 
47 
globalization, neoliberal market policies and the adjunct qualities associated with it such 
as increased technological innovation. To this end the IDRC argues that "technological 
progress supported by the new economic and political arrangements, has been responsible 
for vast improvements in the physical and living standards of most of the world's 
population" (p.8). 
There are however those who scoff this argument arguing that there can be no 
denial as to the marked inequalities that persists between the developed and developing 
world generated by these very policies and economic and political arrangements that 
Wolf and the IDRC make reference to. The realities seemingly contradict this 
perspective. For example "developed countries impose the highest trade barriers on goods 
in which developing countries have competitive comparative advantage at almost 50 
billion dollars a year... The poorest 20 % of the world's people saw their share in income 
decline from 2.3% to 1.4%..., whilst that of the richest 20% grew from 70% to 
85%."(Girvan, 2000:69). Simply allowing the market to choose what is best for society 
is proving to not contribute to the 'common good' as Adam Smith proposed. This 
becomes an argument of ethics versus economics. If the nation state assumes the 
responsibility of the common interests then it is must intervene when there is conflict 
with the private interests (Dierchkxsens, 2000:17), also proposed by Keynes who vied for 
a healthy interaction between private interest and common interest and the subordination 
of the private to the common. (Dierchkxsens, 2000:17). Instead the modus of political 
economy today does not function under a monitored hand of ethics but instead proves 
that private interest and competition does not always lead to the realization of the 
common good. In fact the global ratio of incomes between wealthy and poor in 1969 was 
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30 to 1 and grew to 59 to 1 by 1989, raising the global gini coefficient calculation to .87. 
Additionally the distribution of the worlds wealthiest remain in just a few developed 
countries while the majority of the poor almost a third of the population are in developing 
countries. (Dierchkxsens, 2000:97). This is certainly not representative of any common 
good being realized. Despite arguments otherwise it is clear that states must reconsider 
and determine whether it can, in good conscience let the market determine the 
development of our society. 
It is this seemingly fluid relationship with indistinguishable demarcations of 
processes between globalization and neoliberalism that many are opposed. If innovation 
and technology decline because of decreasing profit as does happen with recessional 
periods, given the current value system we can only gloomily presuppose that those 
already marginalized in this global system will be even more excluded from realizing 
economic success or gaining entrance into the global market, both on the micro and 
macro scale. Already events such as China's overheating economy and US currency 
decline have spiked oil and food prices, are being felt most severely by the world's poor. 
This examination of the theoretical construct of neoliberal globalization will be 
particularly appropriate when moving into the following section on this research 
document to analyse global technology transfer issues. This issue is significant as it has 
in part shaped developing countries' orientation with technology in such a way that it is 
seen as a major aspect in developing countries gaining access to new innovations. The 
following section will provide a brief synopsis of technology transfers, intellectual 
property and the relevant agreements (TRIPS). 
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2.2.6 Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property Agreements 
Technology transfer is the mechanism for the shifting of information across 
borders and its effective diffusion into recipient economies, thus involving numerous 
processes, ranging from innovation and international marketing of technology to its 
absorption and imitation. The process of technology transfer itself, trade terms and 
intellectual property rights, and policies of technology exporting countries, investment, 
and competition issues that can affect the terms if access to knowledge (South Centre 
Trade Analysis, 2005). 
In the previous section, there presented was an exploration of the issue of 
technology and the role it plays in countries' development. Theoretically, technological 
progress has been seen as one of the most important drivers of economic development 
(UNCTAD, 2007). In the pursuit of attaining this economic development, developing 
countries have been facing several obstacles. Their inability to create and integrate avante 
garde technologies into existing economic structures has led to what Gamster, Appleton, 
and Carter (1990) noted as an economic "tale full of problems and short on progress" 
(p. 10). This issue of technology transfer is critical to this debate as aforementioned 
technology has been linked as a powerful catalytic force in enabling socio economic 
growth in the north, however if under the rules of neoliberalism, barriers are being placed 
to prevent the acquisition of these new technologies, we begin to question the structures 
that allow this inequality to persist in the first place. 
Technology transfers are not all equal but instead come in the form of packages 
usually transferred through foreign direct investments (FDI) or through contractual 
agreements (Robinson, 1988; Bozeman, 2000). The transfers can come in the form of 
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core or peripheral technologies; the former refers to that which are essential to a process, 
product or for the provision of a service, the latter is simply all other non essential 
technologies. Furthermore, Robert notes that the transfers may be in the form of hard or 
soft goods which are embodied and disembodied technology respectively. Other 
associated transfer products such as skills and knowledge, are sometimes just as delicate 
as the physical products themselves, because of the patents that may be held for these 
products. Many of these patents are protected under the TRIPS and TRIMS agreements, 
giving the sending firms or states a "legal monopoly" with an opportunity to benefit 
greatly from the 'rents' received, for any material that is legally patented. 
Currently technology transfers represent the most prevalent method for 
developing countries to gain access to technologies from developed countries. This is in 
part because countries in the south generally do not have the capital, developed human 
skills, to invest in extensive research and development (R&D); in fact the South[still] 
remains ill equipped to locally research, and produce modern technologies" (Bardouille, 
1998:80). Developing countries rely heavily on both the physical technologies and the 
assistance in maintenance, training etc. for equipment. 
Serious issues have arisen from this relationship; the appropriateness of 
technologies, the socio cultural constraints to integration of technologies, cost of 
technologies and use of used technologies. Martin Hart-Landsberg (1987) in an attempt 
to debunk the 'myths of the superiority of free trade' notes that with respect to the trade 
related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS) and trade related investment 
measures (TRIMS), the rules of the engagement and gains of these agreements have been 
dubious. One reason for this Robinson (1988) argues is that when negotiations between 
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firms take place, say between a large fortune 500 firm and a smaller single product firm 
it "is unlikely to lead to an equitable arrangement for the latter, which is likely to the 
party on the LDC end." (p.86). 
Landsberg (2006) argues that the TRIMS agreement severely handicaps states' 
ability to restrict place performance requirements on (FDI), while TRIPS limits states 
jurisdiction in either denying patents or controlling the use of patents within their own 
borders. This for example then bars states' ability to control the affordability and 
accessibility of important medicines for particularly poor nations. He argues that as a tool 
in the neoliberal free trade process, TRIPS and TRIMS has served to increase gains for 
developed countries at the expensive of poorer nations. 
2.2.7 Developing Societies and Digital Access: The Digital Divide 
"In general the wealthy people are seen as the ones who can afford to purchase the 
technology and acquire the skills necessary to use it while the poor are restricted by 
barriers such as poverty and illiteracy; this is baseline for the Digital Divide 
concept. "(Henry, 2007: 3). 
In a report released by the UNDP on the issue of development and digital 
opportunities, a correlation was established between the growth and level of technology. 
In 2001 the United Nations expressed full support for the establishment of the two phased 
World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) held in Geneva and Tunisia 
respectively. The purpose of this Summit was meant to create open dialogue and "foster a 
clear statement of political will and take concrete steps to establish the foundations for an 
information society for all" (WSIS, 2003). The adopted resolution was a clear indication 
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that the UN saw ICTs as a crucial part of contemporary development issues and that it 
could be significant too in achieving the Millennium Development Goals. 
To state simply the digital divide is the "uneven access to and diffusion of 
technology" (UNDP 2001 in Rigobert, 2006: 38). For example OECD countries alone 
currently have 79% of the world's internet users UNDP, 2001: 3-8). Since its entrance 
into the political economy debate from the early 1990s, the digital divide concept has 
been privy to much "scientific hairsplitting and political opportunism"(Djik, 2005:3). 
This is because for each unique interpretation, there are usually severe implications, 
whether political, economic, or social and many times all three. The digital divide is not 
independent of other world issues but instead is a direct reflection of the inequalities that 
already persist in our society. The implications of this lack of access to information 
technologies are married to the implications of other structural issues which both cause 
and maintain poverty around the globe. 
As in our previous section on technology, to better understand this issue is it 
imperative to unpack and deconstruct its meanings and implications. The ubiquitous use 
of technology, particular information communication technologies in all spheres of life 
has called for us to pay attention to who has access and who does not. Scholars predict 
that computer literacy and access to information technologies will become a relevant 
currency in providing persons an opportunity to participate in economic activities. 
Economists such as Kirkman, Sachs and Stone (2001), likewise argue that there can no 
longer be any doubt about the importance of every economy plugging into global 
information and communication networks. The new information and communication 
technologies and the Internet in particular, have changed the rules of economic 
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competitiveness. The UNDP has also "identified] the roles that information and 
communication technologies (ICT) can play in fostering sustainable economic 
development and enhancing social equity inter and intra nationally. 
The growing importance of these ICTs only makes its highly inequitable 
distribution both inter and intra nationally even more troubling. Allowing for differences 
in population in the 2002 United Nations Digital Access Index indicated that countries 
ranking with the lowest access were, on a scale of 0-1, were Niger with 0.04, Burkina 
Fasso 0.08 and Mali 0.09 (note all countries were developing countries), while ICT 
access in developed countries was at the highest as 0.85 in Sweden, 0.83 Denmark and 
0.82 Iceland and Korea (Rep) respectively8 (WSIS 2003). One can see that there is .8 of a 
difference in access between the countries with the highest and lowest access. It is this 
discrepancy with regard to digital access that has now captured the attention of the global 
community. In recognition of the digital access gap by the mid '00s digital poverty had 
now been seen as part of the material resources that all human beings had a right of 
access and has then became part of the measures used within the poverty index. 
Kenneth Kennistan and Deepak Kumar argue, in their Experience in India: 
Bridging the Digital Divide, that the digital divide encompasses four divides or four gaps 
which separate those who have and those who do not. They see that this divide has much 
wider implications than just an international gulf between internet users and non users 
and instead posit this issue within a much larger context while acknowledging the 
This index was based on five categories such as infrastructure (phone lines and mobile cellular 
availability), affordability (internet access prices as a percentage of gross national income per 
capita), knowledge (adult literacy and enrollment in primary, secondary and tertiary levels), 
quality (international internet bandwidth per capita as well as broadband per 100 subscribers), and 
lastly usage (internet users per 100 inhabitants). 
http://www.itu.int/newsroom/press releases/2003/30.html. 
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different levels of disparity between and within societies. Kenniston and Kumar noted 
that the intra nation wealth gap which exists within, and between societies, even in 
countries that experience high economic growth. 
Even within the U.S that has one of the world's highest levels of connectivity of 
both internet and telephone, there were still distinct differences within the access of 
families which was strongly related to their income brackets and ethnic orientation. 
White and Asian Americans had three or more times greater connectivity than African 
American and Hispanics even when all households were in the same income bracket of 
$35,000 a year. Kennistan and Kumar argue that the cultural relevance of internet 
material is largely responsible for this alienation of Blacks and Hispanics, particularly 
because most American websites did not cater to the interest of neither group; instead 
there is a distinctly dominant English speaking "Anglo Saxon culture" (Kennistan and 
Kumar 2004). In the 2002 ECLAC report, serious concerns were highlighted that the 
"internal digital divide in Latin America and the Caribbean was more worrisome that the 
international one" (p.6). This was because they understood the significance of technology 
as continually polarizing and perpetuating income inequalities in a region that already 
faces some of the world's highest inequality. Other than socio economic status, Selwyn 
(2000), Servon (2002), note that within states the digital divide is manifested between 
other social groups. He argues that the divide also runs between genders and generations. 
He notes that more men have access to ICTs while access is inversely correlated with age 
(p.5). 
A second divide exists within the international realm where disparities with 
access to digital media and economic opportunity are juxtaposed. An incredible 69% of 
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Americans own a computer versus the 8% of Indians who do. There are millions in rural 
India who not only have no access to telephones connections but have also never even 
made a telephone call. This is not surprising when one takes into account the lack of 
socio economic and physical infrastructure that still exists in India and in many 
developing countries. Bangalore in India for example has an adult education rate of only 
5.1 years and illiteracy rate of 44%. Developed countries who have reached literacy rates 
of 100% are therefore much better able to participate in the digital economy and utilize 
the technologies that are available. 
The third and also critical divide is the linguistic and culturally relative 
information gap. The cultural and linguistic hegemony of English and 'northern' 
languages within digital media has barred many non English societies from participating 
in internet experiences. This perpetuates the divide between the 50 million Indians who 
do speak English as opposed to hundreds of millions more who do not. This scenario is 
replicates both internationally and intra with many non English speakers excluded from 
growing movement of digital information. Kennistan and Kumar argue that "60-80% of 
all websites in the world are in English while almost all the rest are in one of the major 
"Northern" languages like Japanese, German, French, Spanish, Portuguese, and 
increasingly Chinese" (p. 15). Contrast that with the 1.2 billion South Asians who speak 
other languages. Bourdieu argues is this essential, for persons to use the technologies of 
ICTs properly they must "access to embodied cultural capital; either in person or proxy" 
(Bourdieu in Selwyn, 2004:15). 
Lastly they argue that there is a strong emergence of a "digerati" which is a 
growing affluent class of workers of information based industries creating new forms of 
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elitism (Keniston, 2004:19). While this divide is more particular to the case of India, it 
does carry over in other developed and developing countries where those with increased 
familiarity in the digital industry are gaining eminence and a new status of successes as 
opposed to the many millions who are not directly benefiting from this new economic 
boom. Pantin (1994), suggests that the future dominance of industries such as genetic 
engineering and alternative energy, and space production (to name a few), will spell a 
certain doom for the majority of the world as most are not exposed to the specialized 
education needed for these industries. 
Another aspect to the digital divide is the issue of quality of access. OECD 
countries have seen a marked increase in the rate of broadband usage at 15% compared to 
2% in Latin America and the Caribbean. We cannot underscore the importance of dial up 
as opposed to broadband connections because broadband of course caters for faster, and 
multiple processes. The shift from to increasing internet services can only have the 
impact and harness its full capabilities if the infrastructure of a reliable and fast network 
connection facilitates it (ECLAC, 2007). 
One would be hard pressed to find critiques of this digital divide. That is simply 
because one cannot deny or dispute that there is a large gap between those with access to 
ICTs and those who don't. That said however, there is a growing debate amongst those 
who argue that digital access is not a new phenomena and that it should not be made to 
overshadow other more basic issues such as the provision of basic health and education 
facilities. In fact scholars like Jan Van Djik (2006) argue that the digital divide is yet 
another manifestation of the gross inequalities that have been a consequence of 
globalization and is an implicit reflection of the larger global wealth gap between the 
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north and south. Many question whether this new buzz word has not empowered states 
and development institutes to mask the deeper structural issues that have created such 
poverty and underdevelopment in the first place and more importantly has allowed it to 
continue. There are also growing concerns by critics of the digital divide camp that the 
implementation of ICTs and the creation of digital access will improve the lives of some 
in the developing countries, but only those with the basic knowledge skills to harness that 
technology. 
As a result the existing relationship of inequality and globalization seem clearer 
when placed in a cause and effect equation. As long as inequalities such as dependency 
on foreign aid, unequal and unfair trade relations in the global market are also the 
structures that create and sustain endemic poverty. The addition of digital access or 
digital poverty discourse as new phenomena becomes problematic because it makes 
certain assumptions that in order for developing countries to truly develop they must 
integrate technology into their society and by extension the current 
neoliberal/modernization ideology is the 'true' path of development. 
Benjamin Compaine (2001), in his book, Digital Divide Facing a Crisis or 
Creating a Myth?, makes a pertinent point that the critical divide is (in part) the real 
issues such as the low levels of literacy and human development which prevent persons 
from using these technologies. Technologies are useless to a society that does not have 
the basic capacity to harness its potentialities. According to the UNCTAD 2005 report 
noted that in Botswana "GDP growth has outpaced human development. [For example] 
Botswana's GDP per capita ranks 61st among nations and is 131st on UNDP's Human 
Development Index. No other nation has such a great gap." (p.35). It is large income gaps 
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such as that of Botswana's that has critics such as Sagren Moodley (2005) arguing that 
"the key to integrating ICT in the fight against poverty is not to begin with ICT, nor to 
postulate them as an essential need. Rather, it is to develop and implement a strategy for 
encouraging the deployment of ICT, in support of and subordinate to a national poverty-
reduction strategy." (p. 10). ICTs arguably serve better in societies where basic literacy 
and skills are already established. 
Kenneth Kenistion notes that the dilemma governments now face is that in 
attempting to allocate scarce resources; should ICTs be invested in as a priority, or should 
monies go into establishing basic social infrastructure such as schools, hospitals etc. He 
argues that the reservoir of unmet needs in developing countries far outstrip the available 
aid or funds that can be allocated to basic survival needs.9 
2.3 Caribbean Structural Dependency a Theoretical Background 
"The functioning of the plantation economy generally inhibited [Caribbean] economic 
development" (Mandle, 1982:53). 
Dependency theory became well recognised from the early 1950s to the 1970s. It 
was developed as "a radical alternative to both the conservative theorizing of 
[modernization theorists] and United States global expansion" (Berberoglu, 1992:27). 
Dependency theory conceptualized development through relationships between world 
systems. A. Gunder Frank, one of the most cited dependency theorists, argued that 
Kenneth Kenniston author of "Bridging the Digital Divide IT Experience in India" talks about 
an exchange with an Indian scholar where he says.. ."When I mentioned to the great scholar of 
India the late Myron Werner, my interest in IT in India, he asked whether I meant the use of 
computers in Indian schools. I allowed that this was indeed an interest. He burst out, "Are you 
insane? Don't you realize that there are 60 million Indian children who are not in school at all? 
"For the cost of a computer, you can have a school". (Keniston, 2004:19). This shows the 
opportunity cost developing countries face in investing in ICTs. 
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underdevelopment was "the result of historical development and contemporary structure 
of world capitalism," which "arose from the way the third world was incorporated into an 
international economic and political system, dominated by Europe and later the United 
States"(Ghosh, 200:41). Although dependency theory arose primarily from a Latin 
American conceptualization, the Caribbean was co opted under these theories because of 
their similar shared colonial history. Later, Andre Gunder Frank established dependency 
theory as an understanding for all developing countries as opposed to the specialized 
reality of Latin America region. 
Frank made a clear distinction in dependency theory between undeveloped and 
underdeveloped and surmised that in order to understand the difference between 
undevelopment of underdevelopment, it was essential to recognize the significance of the 
society's economic and social history and its impact on their present condition. For him, 
being undeveloped as is implied, was a country that had not initiated the development 
process as opposed to underdeveloped, which implies countries that had been developed 
and was going through a reversal of process. Poorer countries historically did experience 
development due to colonization, but regressed after independence. 
The fundamental premise of this perspective focused on the presence of 
"asymmetrical relationships of trade, investment, finance and technology with 
metropolitan economies" thus dividing the world into two basic systems (Girvan, 
2005:5). These two subsystems are part of what is considered the world capitalist system, 
which was also paralleled to internal, local capitalist economy systems. Developing 
countries were considered the periphery or satellites, while developed countries were the 
centre economies. The two systems engage in an uneven relationship where a "systematic 
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transfer of economic surplus continually occur[s] from the base of the world structure 
(periphery) to the metropolitan centre of advanced countries" and saw this type of 
relationship occurring at not both the macro and micro level (Frank, 1966:42). The main 
purpose was to extract an economic surplus, usually raw materials, from less developed 
countries, at comparably low prices to allow a larger profit margin in metropole 
countries. It also allowed the manufactured goods to be shovelled back into peripheries at 
much higher prices than their own products. 
To dependency theorists this certainly was not a new phenomenon, but in fact was 
a progressive truth in history. Frank noted that the economic and social history of 
underdeveloped nations continued in much the same vein from colonialism, to their free 
trade era, progressively increasing in 'polarization' of domestic economies. "Centuries of 
colonialism became so deep seated that they served to perpetuate the essential economic 
dependency of the peripheral nations on leading capitalist centers even after... 
decolonization" Beckford in Girvan (2005) argues that the 'persistence of poverty' in 
former plantation economies are the direct result of both a distortion in resource 
allocation and the exclusion of large portions of the population (in the case of the 
Caribbean the slaves) in this resource distribution, generally determined by ones class 
orientation. In the Caribbean this legacy lives on with class systems closely tied to 
income and educational opportunities. 
Frank also theorized that given such a relationship of servitude, satellites had their 
"greatest economic achievement and especially their most classically capitalistic 
industrial development if and when their ties to their metropolis [were] weakest," (Frank, 
1966:42). He isolated five periods in history, the Napoleonic wars, the European 
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depression, the First World War, the 1930's depression, and the Second World War, 
when centre economies experienced economic crises and were not as economically 
active. Frank surmised that at those points in history "satellites initiated marked 
autonomous industrialization and growth," and or experienced social revolutions (p.45). 
Therefore alluding that "peoples of the periphery can only liberate themselves from its 
disastrous effects by breaking with the world capitalist system (delinking)" (Amin, 
1996:63). While Amin's assertions and delinking may seem drastic if nothing else, what 
Caribbean states can gather from this is a strong desire to achieve greater independence 
within the global system. Currently countries such as Brazil and Venezuela are both on 
this path, the former claiming independence from foreign oil sources and the latter 
attempting to gain more control of its own vast oil sources. 
What dependency theorists made note of that is particularly important for the 
Caribbean region is that countries today that are the most underdeveloped, were generally 
the largest exporters of raw material. The Caribbean has historically been intensive 
providers of raw materials to the British and Portuguese empire and was the 'backbone of 
the mercantile system'. Frank opined that when these regions were given independence 
their economic, social and political structure "prohibited autonomous generation of 
economic development and...degenerate[ed] into the underdevelopment we find today" 
(p.48). Dependency academics essentially have theorised the development quandary of 
comparative advantage. 
Sir William Arthur Lewis' economic prescriptions strongly influenced the 
direction in which many Caribbean governments steered their policies. He argued that as 
Caribbean countries were labour surplus economies, their engagement in the production 
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of intensive labour products was far more beneficial than the incorporation of factory 
technologies. He argued that the production of labour intensive products allowed 
Caribbean countries to keep costs low and maintain a competitive edge in world markets. 
Lewis' model relied on keeping labour costs low a factor that heavily impacted the 
displacement of funds away from investments of new technologies. The rationalization 
was that low labour would bring in foreign investments and multinational corporations to 
invest in the region. The vestiges of these economic strategies have survived. Today 
CARICOM states continue to court MNCs at the cost of ecological liberalization and 
overly generous tax holidays. Most importantly however the region has spent the last few 
decades organizing their economic come-out vis a vis the policies of external agents. 
The Caribbean exemplifies this idea of a colonial and neo-colonial dependency 
moving from structural dependence on a plantation economy to a dependence on 
multinational corporations. The latter will be particularly pertinent to this research when 
we delve into issues of technological dependency and technology transfers, as well as 
well as the Caribbean's earnest courting of foreign direct investments. 
2.3.1 Uneven Development CARICOM Responses to Globalization 
"globalisation has generated strong cross currents within the region. Differences in 
production structures and external association have often resulted in contradictory short 
term interests among countries and marked divergences in economic policy " (Girvan, 
2000:75). 
Like any region attempting to forge a path to economic prosperity, the Caribbean 
or more precisely for the purpose of this thesis, CARICOM10, has met with several 
CARICOM is a fifteen member state organization comprised of former British colonies and is 
currently all Commonwealth territories. With the exception of Suriname and Haiti, CARICOM is 
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obstacles. A commingling of exogenous and endogenous factors has played a role in 
inhibiting the region from exploring its full potentialities and maximizing its scarce 
resources. This is no less true with regard to the regions' affiliation with technology. As it 
stands most of the CARICOM member states are on the disadvantaged end of the digital 
divide, with technology sectors that are underfunded, outdated and heavily reliant on 
technology transfers from foreign companies and countries. CARICOM states however 
have expressed a clear desire to increase technology access and ICT availability and use, 
thereby emerging them into a knowledge society. Member states have recognized that in 
order to stay competitive in the current global economy, it is vital to integrate technology 
in such a manner that it can increase efficiency, productivity, consumption and the 
capacity and the well being of their citizens. Theoretically the incorporation of 
technology investments in national strategy would be an excellent socio economic macro 
policy direction for CARICOM states; however there are several constraints in achieving 
this valiant goal. The rest of this chapter will engage in discussion to address the 
obstacles that CARICOM faces in achieving a technologically capable society. This 
chapter will serve as the thematic tier to this research giving us a narrower perspective of 
the issues before presentation of data. It will be necessary to trace CARICOMs unique 
circumstances such as the small size of majority of its member states, dependence on 
preferential markets and foreign aid, and fragmentation, all allude to a region that has 
struggled to find a place in a global economy dominated by powers of comparably 
mammoth proportions (Girvan, 2000). 
a grouping of English speaking territories. CARICOMs' objectives are to approach the regions' political 
and economic issues from a collectivist stand, thus improving the success and viability of its peoples. 
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To understand the relationships between the states in the Caribbean and their 
regional affiliations, one must instantly refer to a Venn diagram, where despite countries 
sharing specific and common geographical understanding at the core, clear demarcations 
have been made with regard to size, resources, economic power and language. It is a 
seemingly homogenous region, with extensive underlying fractioning. The Caribbean is 
referenced as the countries washed by the Caribbean Sea, yet this definition does not 
allow for the inclusion of countries such as the Bahamas, Guyana and Suriname who 
share a common cultural identity as opposed to spatiality. To avoid a nomenclatural trap, 
this research has chosen to focus thematically on the CARICOM regional grouping and 
will henceforth refer to this group as the Caribbean. CARICOM11, or the Caribbean 
Community, is a 15 member grouping, comprising mostly of former British colonies and 
Anglophone states (the Commonwealth Caribbean), with the exception of Suriname and 
Haiti. En Masse this region accounts for a population of over six million, With Jamaica 
having the largest population of over two million (40.3% of total CARICOM population 
according to the 2000 census round), and Montserrat with the smallest at little over 12, 
000. CARICOM was created with the mission of sustaining coordinated macroeconomic 
policy with regard to economic activity and foreign policy. This integrative initiative has 
been in process from as far back as the regions' colonial period. Cognizant of their small 
size and limited resources member states have fashioned a political architecture based on 
The fifteen members of CARICOM include Antigua and Barbuda ,the Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and the associated members 
Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, and the Turks and Caicos Islands. Although these 
countries represent mostly the Anglophone population in the Caribbean, there is also Suriname 
and Haiti, former Dutch and French colonies represented within CARICOM. Together, 
CARICOM accounts for a population of approximately 6 million people (Edward 2007: 
unpublished, http://www.caricomstats.org/). 
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collectivists principles in the EU model, to help combat the effects of neoliberal 
globalization and help achieve and sustain development. Their successes however, as this 
section title suggests, has been inconsistent and has contributed to the existing sense of 
deep heterogeneity. For example, Haiti, the region's oldest self governing state 
representing l/6th of the regions' population, has, as of 2007, the lowest GDP in the 
region, also ranking 146 out of 177 countries for Human Development in the 2007 HDI 
report at $1663.00 US (HDI, 2007). The Bahamas on the other end of the spectrum has a 
GDP of $18, 380 US ranking in the top 50 countries with the highest Human 
Development favorable to developed countries. 
Human development is not the only issue CARICOM states have to grapple 
with. Income levels have been equally disparate in the region owing to a number of 
factors. The Caribbean historically has served as an area of agricultural production 
simply for the profit interests of its European colonial powers. Though colonialism has 
long since been abolished, this economic relationship has not changed significantly save 
for a decline in the number of agricultural exports to Europe and the US. The accession to 
full independence in the 1970s, only introduced the Caribbean to their sole responsibility 
of providing economic security for its citizens, as it became obvious that to ensure a 
chance for survival, within the existing patterns of trade had to be rethought. 
2.3.2 Economic Responses: Changing Macroeconomic Policies 
"external actors star in the Caribbean drama." (Schulyer, 1988:6). 
The most lasting impression one has of the Caribbean from both a socio-historical 
and more contemporary view, is that the region has never fully been in control of its 
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destiny. Its people, culture, language, national identity, economic choices, have all been 
dominated by imperial powers either through past colonialism, or today what many 
scholars call a global political economy built on an institution of embedded neocolonial 
activity (to say ideology would imply a clear intent on the part of western, developed 
countries who have in so far securely nested their economic dominance and cultural 
hegemony within the global). The death of Keynesian economics and state regulated 
economic activity led the world into a new mode of operating, centred on unfettered 
industrialization and capitalistic growth. Like most developing countries the Caribbean 
region became embroiled in the new trend paying "little attention to the effects or to the 
necessity of such measures" (Ramsaran, 1988: 75). As a result the region has not been 
able to achieve any significant or sustainable growth. 
According to Ramsaran (1988), "[b]y the 1950s... policymakers in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean began to institute incentives to encourage the establishment of 
manufacturing enterprises" in the pursuit of industrialization (p.75). This trend was 
spurred on by the ideas that developing countries were poor because their industries were 
primary good concentric, as opposed to industrialized countries that had since moved into 
manufacturing goods. Economists and industrialized nations argued that by moving 
developing countries into a manufacturing, countries would bring experience 
development (a prediction that arguably has yet to come true). Scholars such as Schulyer 
(1988) have argued that in the pursuit of development in the case of the Caribbean, it is 
their dependence on foreign corporations and countries that has been their biggest 
downfall. Though the region held stronger cultural ties with Europe it was the "power 
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and proximity of the United States influence in the planning and decision making of 
every Caribbean government" (p.6), which dictated their economic choices. 
These economic choices were tending toward market liberalization, state 
deregulation, privatization and increased mechanization, none of which proved successful 
in integrating the region into the global economy. It did not mask the core issues affecting 
the region, such as low productivity and large gaps between 'import costs and export 
earnings. Much of which was effected as a direct consequence of the infamous Structural 
Adjustment programs (SAPs). The former occurred due to what Demas (2005) calls the 
product of branch plant industrialization' where inappropriate capital intensive industries 
have been installed (p.92). The latter is also particularly important because the Caribbean 
produces little of what it uses, having to import almost all of their goods while exporting 
mostly primary goods which garner considerably less market value. Many Caribbean 
states because of this trade imbalance have times to serious trade and budget deficits 
every year. These deficits have not advanced the debt repayment schedules that, save for 
Cuba, (because of its close political relationship with the Soviet) all Caribbean countries 
have been dealing with (Frasier, 1985). 
It would be difficult indeed to make reference to the state of Caribbean economy, 
without a substantial look at the Structural Adjustment Programmes and the debt that 
followed soon after. Foreign exchange markets were liberalized, multiple exchange rates 
were eliminated and state banks which provided cheap credit to the mining and 
agriculture sector (a significant income generator) were liquidated. These changes were 
typical of structural adjustment policies and neoliberal in principle. The WB/IMF, run 
predominantly by rich industrialized countries, peddled a neoliberal approach to 
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development and arguing that precipitated growth would occur through trade 
liberalization and reduction of government regulation in the economy. These adjustment 
programs were preconditions for Structural Adjustment Loans (SAL) which necessitated 
the aforementioned principles be put in place. 
Despite the few attempts to diversify their economies for the most part, Caribbean 
productivity was concentrated within agriculture. In the period during and directly 
following the implementation of structural adjustment, the Caribbean saw a significant 
decline in export revenue. This was reflective of a global decline, as the Caribbean like 
most developing countries saw a decline in agricultural commodity prices in that time. 
Although growth rates still remained relatively stable at an average of 5%, most of the 
Caribbean islands were experiencing increasing external debt and turned to the IMF and 
SALs for assistance. Jamaica in particular felt the brunt of this as their increasing external 
debt sparked off civil unrest. The end of the 1980s seemed to spell a certain doom for the 
region, with decreasing terms of trade, signaling higher trade deficits and higher debt. 
Most of the Caribbean states were credited with IMF loans, to help curb this cycle but 
instead meant that their debt to GDP ratio was growing at an unsustainable rate, and 
today still is. 
Today Caribbean governments continue on with the restructuring of their 
economic activity under liberalization principles. Beyond the austerity measures, (which 
we must acknowledge is still a significant part of Caribbean economic reality and will be 
for some time to come) more recently the region has received a serious blow to its export 
industry. As part of its accession into the WTO the region has accepted the assumptions 
of reciprocity and equal national treatment (Thomas, 2000). Thus CARICOM has 
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effectively removed capital controls, allowing free movement of capital both in and out 
of the region with little temporal control. What this can and has done, for example in the 
case of the Asian crisis, is create an environment for 'herding behavior', where capital 
flight is volatile "producing sharp up swings and reverse flows" (p. 104) with even a hint 
of slowing or stagnating growth. This volatility exposes the region's vulnerability to the 
external shocks of capital flight and reverse FDI flows. Regardless CARICOM monetary 
policy continues to rely heavily on the wisdom of macroeconomic change tending toward 
global integration and convergence. 
Global integration has not proffered the many benefits as expected. Accepting the 
authority of the WTO has had some adverse effects. Under the 1975 Lome Conventions, 
the newly formed African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, received a series of 
preferential trading arrangements which allowed them to sell their commodities at special 
market value and in with predetermined quotas to the European Union. ACP states also 
received financial assistance to allow them to further develop their industries as well as to 
supplement the generated revenues. Since its inception the Lome agreements have 
changed drastically under international pressures and global dissidence. Lome Fs 
significance to ACP trading was critical as "over 99% of ACP's mainly agricultural 
exports [were] to enter the EU market duty free" (Arts, 1997:4). Lome I was eventually 
renegotiated and replaced by Lome II, which offered more financial and economic 
assistance through which European nations were increasingly providing a "framework of 
cooperation, taking into account the varying needs of developing African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) countries" (Montana, 2003:3). 
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Lome was also pertinent to the Caribbean economy because of the periods of 
Stabilisation of Export Earning Schemes (STABEX) and System of Stabilization of 
Export Earnings from Mining Products (S YSMIN) which was significant in the main 
staying of ACP commodity production. The EU instituted STABEX as a fund where 
ACP states could claim losses suffered in years of particularly high production losses 
suffered due to natural disasters, drought or any unforeseen events. This fund was a 
means of stabilising the economies of developed countries and keep production levels 
constant and as consistent as possible. SYSMIN however, though the same general 
concept as STABEX, was sector specific, allowing the covering of losses within the 
mining sector. This fund was meant mainly to prevent the interruption of mining 
production and keep Europe's flow of raw materials constant. 
By 1992 the political atmosphere within Europe changed as new ideas of 
neoliberafism and structural adjustment took root and soon emerged within ACP/EU 
relations. Ideas of liberalization led to a movement away from ACP protection as the 
European Union wanted to increase trade to other region such as the Mediterranean. 
Montana notes that by 1995 European trade with the Mediterranean rose from 10.4 
billion in 1994 to gross of 13.7 billion in 1995. The problem with the European Union's 
roving eye was further exacerbated by the GATT/WTO rulings which stated that the "non 
reciprocal duty free entry of ACP products into the EU market was a violation of the 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle.. .that aspires to establish and advance non 
discrimination among its members" (Barbarinde, 2004:2). Trading partners of the 
European Union, particularly the US, were increasingly worried about the preferential 
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treatment given to ACP and brought a complaint to the GATT during the Uruguay 
Round. 
Under this ruling the privileged non reciprocal duty free treatment in the ACP 
banana industry was deemed illegal (Babarinde and Faber, 2004). Accounting for the 
WTO's rulings, the new Cotonou agreement gave ACP countries until December 31st 
2007 to trade within the non reciprocal arrangements; allowing only the least developed 
countries to continue non reciprocal trading after the December deadline. ACP states, 
specifically the Caribbean states that relied heavily on revenue from banana and sugar 
exports decried this ruling, but subsequently still lost a significant amount of revenue 
when they faced the realities of a truly open global market. 
It is argued that the Caribbean cannot pursue agricultural development without 
some form of protectionism of developed countries (Mcbain, 2006). What has already 
happened is a significant decline in agricultural production and a shift into more service 
based industries such as tourism. Though it has created positive results in that Caribbean 
economies, the smaller economies of the Eastern Caribbean particularly, have been able 
to diversify, but what has also happened is a significant increase in food prices as 
agricultural production stagnated. In moving to service industries Caribbean countries 
must now engage in hearty technological integration and organizational restructuring in 
order to make their service efficient and competitive, particularly in tourism. The 
challenge in creating new industries based on information and technology is that 
investments in education and personnel are proving fruitless, as now more than ever the 
Caribbean is experiencing extensive migration to developed regions. The resulting 'brain 
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drain' is having a significant impact on the region's ability to adapt and maintain new 
technologies. This will be further discussed in the following section. 
2.3.3 Social Responses Managing the Brain Drain 
"The Caribbean region has borne the deepest and most continuous impact from 
international migration of any region in the world" (Segal, 1987:44-45). 
Like Segal, Marshall (1987) concurred that the "history of Caribbean can be seen 
as a succession of waves of migration" and argued that this phenomena had been 
occurring ever since Emancipation and slaves were granted freedom; 'freedom of 
mobility' (p.25). However Thomas-Hope (1999) argues that while Emancipation did 
guarantee freedom in principle, ex slaves were not free in actuality because of an inability 
to raise their status economically or socially. Migration offered ex-slaves more than just 
economic opportunities but also an acquisition of personal status that would be 
recognized as was previously denied. Migration in this period consisted mostly of inter 
island movement from the smaller islands to larger new sugar producing islands, such as 
Puerto Rico, Dominican Republic and Cuba. Migration gradually increased as industrial 
operations such as construction in Central America, oil drilling and refining in 
Venezuela, and the cutting of the Panama Canal required new labour. By the 1940s 
Caribbean migration shifted to the metropoles as the labour shortage created by World 
War II in the US required that a new source of labour be found. Between 1942 and 1945, 
Marshall (1987) noted that a whopping 400,000 workers had been absorbed by US 
industry. Similar patterns were reflected in the United Kingdom and later on into Canada. 
Contemporary migration is fundamentally similar to that of migratory patterns of 
the past. Within the Caribbean context and that of most other developing countries, it has 
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taken the shape of people moving from countries with low economic activity to countries 
of higher economic activity, where there is the possibility of creating economic 
prosperity. Migration can be "explained by two contemporary global imbalances: the 
widening socio-economic polarization (i.e. widening income gap and the divergence of 
quality of living)" and the "relative ageing of the population in the north necessitating 
replacement labour" (Nurse, 2006:398). The shortage of labour in the OECD countries, 
and the need for replacement labour has led these countries to turn to migration as a 
source of human capital. This need for labour created the 'pull factors' (the factors which 
attract migrants to developed countries). While the "decline in global value added as a 
consequence of implementing structural adjustment programmes and the negative effect 
of neo-liberal restructuring" created the push factors (the factors which compel migrants 
to leave their countries (Nurse, 2006:398). The massive unemployment, poverty, hunger, 
lack of development of social services pushed migrants to seek better opportunities 
elsewhere. Jeffrey Williamson of the IMF noted that between 1999 and 2001 the 
Caribbean lost 10.8 million people due to migration all across the world. It is because of 
this considerable loss to Caribbean society that we now focus on the impact of migration 
to the Caribbean region. 
The Caribbean region has the highest rate of emigration in the world. Although as 
one can imagine the number of immigrants from China and India would far outnumber 
Caribbean migrants, percentage wise, the rate of migration from the Caribbean is much 
higher. What is even more alarming is the increasing rate, particularly of highly skilled 
and highly educated migrants, moving out of the Caribbean. According to Mishra (2006) 
A majority of Caribbean countries have lost more than 50 percent of the labor force in the 
74 
tertiary education segment, and more than 30 percent in the secondary education 
segment" (p.7). She argues that the tertiary education labour force in Jamaica, Guyana, 
and Haiti have been reduced by 85%, 89%, and 84% respectively and that "[i]n fact, 
almost all the Caribbean nations are among the top 20 countries in the world with the 
highest tertiary educated migration rates" (Docquier and Marfouk, 2005:7). 
There has been a marked deficit in literature on the direct economic impact of 
migration on development. In part due to a lack of synchronicity of research and reliable 
data collection from both sending and receiving countries (Docquier and Marfouk, 1999-
2000:2). Growing development problems resulting directly from such a high rate of 
migration has created a pressing need for Caribbean governments to construct more 
stringent national policies. Jean Yan chief scientist of nursing and midwifery for the 
World Health Organization (WHO) noted that the Caribbean suffered a loss of public 
investment in training nurses in the area of US $16.7 million and in 2000 and an 
additional US$13.5 million by 2003, due to migration (p.7). Yan claims that the nurses 
left behind then become overworked and underpaid, now having to pick up the extra 
burden of those who did leave. Yan contemplates that it will take almost 5 years or more 
to restore the Caribbean's nursing staff. This is just one example however. Scholars note 
that the loss to Caribbean development is much higher than can be quantifiably measured. 
For example, Mishra (2006) argues that there is a decided loss of externalities, where 
migrants would have transferred knowledge, knowhow, monitoring and motivation, all of 
which affect productivity. 
Migration however is so deeply entrenched in the Caribbean psyche that scholars 
suggest that it has become institutionalized into Caribbean society, becoming almost 
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monolithic in the face of a possible a reversal of this phenomenon. It is because of this 
Yan (2006) suggests that Caribbean governments develop an integrated approach to 
dealing with the loss of their nurses; however the principles can be applied across the 
board, to all sectors that are feeling the effects of migration. Yan brings attention to the 
Managed Migration Program which is still in its infancy stages and calls for a collective 
response to dealing with an issue that has seemingly become entrenched in Caribbean 
reality. 
2.3.4 Political Responses SIDS Strategic Alliances 
From 1983-1993, the volume of world merchandise increased 71%, while global 
FDI flows increased more than five times from what they were 40 years ago. Today the 
value of world merchandise stands at (US) $ 11.76 trillion dollars (Bernal 2002, WTO 
World Trade Report, 2007). Clearly the scale with which economic activity took place in 
the past few decades has intensified significantly. Political readjustments have been just 
as significant. Moving from what Bernal posits as an atomized world economy of nation 
states to a seamless global economy (p, 296). With the integration of world economies, 
small states are dwarfed by the economic powers of more powerful developing countries. 
Beyond states transnational and multinational corporations are gaining just as much 
power, as their billion dollar incomes allow them economic and political might, that have 
placed them at the centre of many politically driven forums. The amalgamations of these 
economic giants have left little room for CARICOM countries to exert any influence in 
the decisions ironically that most affect them. One of these options has been the strategic 
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collectivization of foreign and domestic authority of CARICOM states into a regional 
integrated body (RIA). 
Under the simple adage of 'strength in numbers', the Caribbean region has been 
engaged in a long and slow process of developing regionalism. From its 1958 inception 
the West Indies Federation and all integration movements thereafter, have been tainted 
with failure. Edward Greene (2005) notes that "[t]he birth and growth of the Caribbean 
integration movement is a fascinating history of progress toward and retreat from 
objectives identified by respective advocates", and is essentially a history of division and 
unity (Nelson, 2002). The commonalities between states within CARICOM have 
surprisingly not been catalytic in creating a mature regional structure as was enjoyed by 
the European Union. The political climate within the region has never been of complete 
solidarity, a situation that has significantly delayed the potentiality that full and mature 
regionalism would provide. 
In 1972, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) was formed, meant to foster an 
emerging common market. Over thirty years later the successes of the region in creating 
an economically prosperous and politically cohesive region area remained dubious. 
Among the objectives "to promote the expansion and diversification of trade", 
(www.caricom.org) secure trade in an environment of fair competition and ensure the 
equitable distribution of the benefits of free trade amongst members. CARICOM's 
objectives were extended to include a more functional arrangement with "the 
coordination of the foreign policies of Member States" (Treaty of Chaguaramas). The 
reality of CARICOM was that "experts found that while some modest gains were made in 
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the area of trade and functional cooperation, very little progress was made towards the 
achievement of major objectives outlined in the treaty." (Ramsaran 1989). 
In the twenty first century CARICOM is trying to change to accommodate the 
demands of a fast paced globalised world. Currently several of the island states are 
operating on budgetary deficits importing significantly more than they earn. Much of the 
actual revenue generated is siphoned away to pay for the significant debts accrued during 
the structural adjustment years. While CARICOM markets are small, their integration is 
vital in maximizing scarce resources. The introduction of CSME in the Revised Treaty of 
Chaguaramas shows the organizations' intent on creating a space that can promote 
regional development while slowly moving toward the preparations for becoming 
globally relevant. It is the hope that the common single market will create the 
synchronicity in economic policy to allow CARICOM states to share information, 
maximize scarce resources, and allow free movement of people thus improving the value 
and marketability of skill and labour and a free movement of goods that would allow 
local markets to extend and grow while gaining access to a larger consumer base. 
2.4 Technological Orientation: CARICOM and the Digital Divide 
"The ongoing debate in Latin America and the Caribbean regarding the transition to an 
information society and to the digital era is often based on 'stylized facts' and theoretical 
constructs deriving from developed countries" (ECLAC, 2003:9). 
The above quote from the 2003 Economic Commission in Latin and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC) report, 'Road Maps toward an Information Society in Latin America 
and the Caribbean', highlights a critical if not perennial issue affecting the region. Much 
of the Latin American and Caribbean's development policy is and has been heavily 
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influenced by theoretical models based on developed countries and their experiences. 
Most will argue, more particularly experiences such as the policy prescriptions of 
Washington Consensus and the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), has been 
mostly influential in the architectural design of the regions' political economy, arguably 
much to their detriment. According to the ECLAC report, the Caribbean region with few 
exceptions has not achieved conditions satisfactory, to launch itself into the information 
society because of low "[g]rowth rates in the wake of market liberalization and 
deregulation programmes," as well, "aggregate performances have deteriorated 
substantially in recent years" (ECLAC, 2003:9). 
These obstacles have been coupled with the declining foreign direct investment, 
which in the past had facilitated the boom in infrastructure in telecommunications. For 
example two of the largest communications companies in the region are U.K. based 
Cable and Wireless, and Digicel, which compete to provide mobile telephony and 
complimentary mobile services. Most importantly the report notes that the region does 
not have the institutional capacity to support a transition into the digital age. This lack of 
investment has severely inhibited the pace at which technological advancement is being 
introduced and integrated within the region. "In fact local technological advancements do 
not appear to be a priority for national agents. As a result, the productivity gap separating 
the region from the developed world has not narrowed, and the structural heterogeneity of 
firms, regions and social groups has increased." (ECLAC, 2003:9). The generally low per 
capita income levels of most countries have proven to slow or inhibit the ability 
of the LAC region in incorporating technology into a more functioning component in 
their production. Income indicators are one of the most significant factors in determining 
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local technology demands, however separate from individuals, firms and business in the 
CARICOM region are generally small they do not have the resources financially or 
otherwise to maximize and efficiently co-opt any technologies that may have been 
produced locally, nor do they have the capital to suffer any risks involved in pursuing 
such ventures (Nasbeth, 1973). CARICOM states are not all equal, thus their responses to 
technological change have been equally disparate. 
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Chapter 3 - A CASE STUDY: CARICOM 
3.1 CARICOM and the Global Political Economy 
"Globalization ...accentuates the differences among Caribbean economies by creating a 
dual pattern of specialization, so that the countries are divided between service based 
and goods-producing economies" (ECLAC, Chapt. 11:332). 
In a general context, globalization almost always elicits conflicting responses, 
from complete support to complete disillusion. Despite this situation, it is irrefutable that 
"real interest rates are 4 times higher for poor countries than rich countries or that 83% of 
foreign direct investment goes to rich countries", and the perpetuation of many other 
inequalities (Girvan, 2000: 69). In the case of CARICOM, globalization to a larger extent 
has made inequalities in member states more visible as sectoral growth responses have 
varied significantly over time, producing countries in the top 20 of the United Nations 
Human Development Index and countries like Haiti in the bottom 50. It is fair to say that 
in the last decade in some Caribbean states namely, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname and 
Trinidad and Tobago, there has been a significant drop in personal wealth and people 
have in general become poorer (Watson, 1994). It is important to note that this is not the 
same for all of CARICOM, as the smaller states, such as the OECS states have fared far 
better than the larger territories. More detail will be presented further down in this 
section. Reduction in personal wealth however, is just one of the challenges that 
globalization has brought to the Caribbean region. 
Over the last decade, in general, CARICOM experienced a blanket increase in the 
service sector and decline in the agricultural sector (with the exception of Guyana). The 
reduction in the agricultural sector were attributed to three factors, high production costs, 
external shocks and unwavering dependence on preferential trading agreements with the 
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European Union (ECLAC, 2001). Though climatically and geographically primed for 
agriculture, Caribbean states have not been received the best prices on the market. 
Manufacturing has gone down; with the only area showing real growth in almost all 
CARICOM states is tourism and services as Table 1 will show. Overall the Caribbean's 
share of world exports declined from .28% in 1985 to .13% in 1999 (ECLAC). Though 
the increase in tourism has not balanced the loss of revenue from reduced production, the 
region has gained some ground as they account for over 50% of world cruise ship 
passengers . Compounding the reduction in output, CARICOM's imports have 
significantly outweighed their export bill, accruing yearly trade deficits. Between 2005 
and 2007 alone CARICOM countries spent in excess of over US $4 million more on 
imports than they earned on exported goods as Table 2 and 3 will illustrate. 
In order to stay competitive in the face of growing debt and continual loss of 
revenue in both the agricultural and manufacturing services, CARICOM embraced the 
laissez faire polices and adopted the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAPS) package. 
Structural adjustment was indicative of a time of; one, the dominance of US economic 
policies facilitated through the machine of supranationalsim within the IMF and World 
Bank and the WTO, and two, the lack of choice that many developing states such as 
Jamaica were presented with when seeking monetary assistance. Particularly as 
stabilization packages were to taken en masse or not at all, in the face of growing debt 
and economic crisis in the 80s, Caribbean states had little option but acquiesce to the 
policy directives of SAPS. Like many other developing countries CARICOM too is faced 
with the restructuring of global political sovereignty into the hands of large multinational 
bodies that arguably are run on the interests of a cadre of developed countries. 
12 See ECLAC The effects of Globalization in CARICOM Caribbean Countries 
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Reduced government intervention and liberalized markets, the corner stone of 
neoliberal globalization, (did not produce the expected benefits. The foreign debt taken 
on by many states to initialize the industrial policies, have remained as a fixed feature in 
contemporary Caribbean economics. 
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For example Jamaica's debt servicing accounted for "approximately 80% of 
government revenue and 70% of government expenditures in Jamaica, 1990 to 1994" 
(Williams, 2002:8). For states such as St. Kitts, Guyana, Jamaica and Belize, the debt 
servicing is over 10% of all revenue earned from goods and services as noted in Table 4. 
With external public debt growing at a rate of 8.9% for the whole of CARICOM, the 
amount of money available for other purposes such as education continues to depress. 
Public expenditure on education has decreased in Trinidad and Tobago, Saint Lucia, and 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
According to Juliet Elu (2000) Jamaica's debt as a percentage of its GDP was at 
19%, with Trinidad and Tobago almost doubling from 6.8% to 14.8%. Guyana was hit 
the hardest with a ratio of external debt to GNP at 158% (Worrel, 1987). What resulted 
were a series of new loans being siphoned to service debt, as well as a significant portion 
of revenues from goods and services, rather than being channeled into public expenditure, 
as per the agreements of the IMF austerity measures. In hindsight what most scholars, 
economists and politicians of that time will tell you, the result was actually a conscious 
divergence of state led development to market led development. Something we can 
appreciate as having almost no sustainable and or desirable effect on human 
development. 
This economic management however has stemmed from an ideological 
underpinning of neoclassical thought, as "economists in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
have never abandoned the view that economic theories and prescriptions developed in the 
metropolitan countries are equally applicable to the Caribbean, with minor adjustments" 
(Pantin 1994: 62). 
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Table 2: VALUE OF TOTAL IMPORTS BY CARICOM 
COUNTRIES: 2005 - 2007 
VALUE OF TOTAL IMPORTS BY CARICOM COUNTRIES 
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Adapted from: http.V/www. caricomstats. org 
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Table 3: VALUE OF TOTAL DOMESTIC EXPORTS BY CARICOM 
COUNTRIES 2005 - 2007 
VALUE OF TOTAL DOMESTIC EXPORTS BY CARICOM COUNTRIES 
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Adapted from: http://www. caricomstats. org 
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Table 4: CARICOM'S DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF ITS GDP AT MARKET PRICES 
Table 4: CARICOM'S DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS AS A PERCENTAGE 
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Adapted from: http://www. caricomstats. org 
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Table 5: CARICOM'S DEBT SERVICE RATIO 
(Debt Service Payments as a percentage of Exports of Goods and Services) 
1998 - 2000 
CARICOM'S DEBT SERVICE RATIO 
(Debt Service Payments as a percentage of Exports of Goods and Services) 
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Adapted from: http://www. caricomstats. org 
Liberalized financial markets have left the region vulnerable to large capital 
flights and capital mobility (massive capital flight can prove extremely detrimental as the 
Asian economic crisis in the 1990s has proven). Williams (2002) noted that capital flight 
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"exceeded US$800, equivalent to about 5% of GDP for Jamaica; for Trinidad and 
Tobago US$ 896 equivalent to 2% of GDP; and for Guyana it was $646 equivalent to 
26% of GDP" (in millions) (Bennett in Williams, 1999: 9), a situation which has shown 
little sign of change. 
3.2 Assessing the Caribbean Digital Framework & Digital Strategy 
"Recognising too the need for an agenda that is concerned with ensuring a 
comprehensive CARICOM Connectivity regime that strives to achieve maximum 
benefits oflCTfor the Region=s peoples, and for sustaining economic growth and 
social development, especially in areas of governance, empowerment, poverty 
reduction, investment and resource support and widespread access to training 
and resources; (Revised Draft Georgetown Declaration CARICOM Ministers 
responsible for Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 2003). 
CARICOM over the last ten years have been actively engaged in dialogue 
surrounding the commoditization of knowledge. Much of the dialogue has been aimed at 
understanding the extent to which a transition to a knowledge society is desirable and 
subsequently strategic regional approaches to maximize benefits. In 2001 The 
Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC), commissioned by CARICOM, 
produced a diagnostic report on the readiness of CARICOM's capacity for e-business 
development. These reports were of a few that carefully outlined the then infrastructural 
ability and future possibilities of ICT development. Although the reports' focus was 
centred on ICT development for e-business purposes, they provided a synoptic view of 
the rationale of ICT development within CARICOM and the strategies that would 
provide optimal results. Table 6 provides an illustration of ICT agendas across the region 
and their progress as of 2008. 
89 
The core findings suggested that as CARICOM states continually increased their 
proportion of trade and tourism activity relative to their GDPs, their interaction with the 
global economy would become more integrative and complex. 
As such while CARICOM states increased their chances of economic success, 
they also increased the chances of market volatility and vulnerability. In fact this 
vulnerability was already proving visible as "much of the CARICOM region 
.. .experienced instances of negative economic growth in the last ten years" (Singh, 
2001:6). In the report Singh concluded that the extensive amount of importation and 
taxation, high transactional costs in shipping and banking, added to low productivity as 
well as stagnated technology are some of the symptomatic responses of an unprepared 
region within this highly digitized and knowledge centred economy. The reports' 
recommendations called for, an overall development of an info-structure, with attention 
to the introduction of inexpensive hardware and software, appropriate legal and financial 
framework, a supportive political and business environment added to a well developed 
human resource to support any further initiatives. Most importantly the document called 
for the initiatives to be applied by CARICOM states through a collaborative effort, 
allowing for a maximization of resources and effective results. Table 8 provides an 
overview of some of the subsequent national IT agendas that have been created in some 
of the CARICOM countries. 
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Table 6: CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): NATIONAL STRATEGIES FOR INFORMATION 
SOCIETIES, JANUARY 2008 
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Building on this report, in 2003 CARICOM created the Towards CAR1COM 
Connectivity Agenda and Platform for Action policy framework. These policies were 
created to address the 'fundamental elements of the GARICOM connectivity agenda'. 
The document highlighted that the essential purpose of connectivity is a society's internal 
capacity for communication with its global environment through the use of 
telecommunications, information technologies, and through the products of its content 
industries and its ability to enable countries and communities in the evolution toward the 
information and knowledge-based society. In light of this goal, the report identified a 
three pronged stratagem that would shape policy directed toward ICT development. The 
three part approach would consist of ICT infrastructure, utilization and content. 
Infrastructural concerns encompassed the physicality of ICTs such as the hardware and 
software packages, a capable human resource and a reliable telecommunications network. 
Utilization extended toward the value added use and application of both the digital 
information and services provided to facilitate the ease of use and generation of 
knowledge. The final component for CARICOM connectivity, content, refers mainly to 
the provision of high quality digital information and services for the region. 
The agenda called for the above three pillars of connectivity guidelines be 
sanctioned through a regional and hemispheric effort, to include Latin America, through 
Inter American Telecommunications Commission CITEL and the Organisation of 
American States OAS, yet respecting the individuality of CARICOM members' national 
needs. Another notable aspect of the connectivity agenda is the creation of ICT systems 
13 Note CARICOM has also been engaged in concurrent technology dialogues with ECLAC and CITEL, 
however the 2003 Towards CARICOM Connectivity Agenda and Platform for Action, provided policy 
guidelines particular to CARICOM and its regional idiosyncrasies. 
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that are interoperable within the Common Single market Economy (CSME) framework. 
This is quite significant as under a CSME mandate, ICT development would catapult and 
deepen regional integrative movements within CARICOM. 
The guiding principles of CARICOM connectivity are mainly equitability, 
universality and affordability, under which civil society participation is deemed necessary 
in carving out an appropriate regulatory framework. The agenda also outlines other 
principles such as protection of intellectual property and information protection 
mechanisms. This framework was created with a specific end goal for the region and 
individual member states. The end goal of the connectivity agenda is to provide 'access 
to the global information structure', produce and develop e government, e-communities, 
e-commerce addressing blanket areas of health, education, employment, human rights, 
investment strategies, democracy and civil society participation, tourism, gender equality 
and economic development. 
The connectivity agenda there is also strong emphasis on the provision of legal 
regulatory bodies in providing a secure environment for new businesses as well as 
regional cooperation in creating a 'harmonized spectrum policy framework' to realize 
coordinated efforts such as regional 'hubs' and network access points. Developed in 
2003, member states have since then integrated this agenda into their national plan of 
action, so far some with more success than others. Under the current Caribbean ICT 
agenda, there are several intergovernmental bodies working together (see Table 7 and 8), 
on creating national and regional priorities, however one of their constraints so far has 
been adequate resource support. 
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Table 7: SELECT CARIBBEAN ICT AGENDA LEAD ORGANIZATIONS 
Organization 
Caribbean Knowledge and 
Learning Network (CKLN) 
Regional Research and 
Education Network for the 
Caribbean (CARIBNET) 
Caribbean Centre for 
Development Administration 
(CARICAD) 
Latin America and Caribbean e-
Government Network (Red 
GEALC) 
Commonwealth's Support for 
Public ICT Policies 
The Commonwealth Network of 








An initiative to increase capacity and improve competitiveness of 
human resources throughout the region with the use of ICT. 
Endorsed by the CARICOM Heads of States on 2006 as a measure 
to reduce social exclusion, 
digital divide, uneven connectivity and limited participation in 
education, knowledge and 
Research networks. It is to be managed by CKLN. 
As mentioned earlier, this CARICOM initiative aims to improve 
the efficiency of the public sector of its fourteen (14) member 
countries and modernize government institutions through technical 
assistance, capacity building for strategic management and 
regional meetings. 
This network of e-government professionals supported by the 
Organization of American States (OAS) promotes cooperation and 
exchange of experiences and best practices among government 
institutions, officials and technicians. It organizes periodic 
meetings and capacity building initiatives and workshops. It also 
enables virtual working groups, a horizontal cooperation fund and 
maintains a database of e-government experts in the region. 
The Commonwealth of Nations groups fifty three (53) states 
which were once under the rule or politically associated with the 
United Kingdom, mostly former British Colonies. Among them 
are ten (10) Caribbean States: Antigua and Barbuda, The 
Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago and Saint Kitts 
and Nevis. As a voluntary nonpolitical association, the 
Commonwealth promotes cooperation among its members and 
channels technical assistance to key development areas, actively 
supporting policy development and capacity building initiatives in 
the Caribbean 
Established in 1995 and endorsed by the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government, COMNET-IT actively promotes and supports 
"policy resources and best practice in e-government and 
informatics strategies". 
The current structure of CTO as an international partnership of 
governments, businesses and civil society institutions evolved 
from its former role as the Pacific Cable Board, established in 
1901. Through a large number of funding, co-operation, technical 
assistance, knowledge sharing and capacity building initiatives the 
CTO aims to "bridge the digital divide and achieve social and 
economic development" and "fulfill the global development 
agenda for ICT". 
The Commonwealth Heads of State, following up on the 
commitments from the recent WSIS Summit, launched the 
Commonwealth Action Programme for the Digital Divide at the 
end of 2005. The program, later re-branded as "Commonwealth 
Connects", makes ICT policy recommendations to bridge the 
digital divide on five areas: 
Adapted from: Carlos Levy 2007 "Information Society and public ICT policies in the 
Caribbean: a review of advances and challenges, policy instruments and country 
experiences" ECLAC 
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Adapted from: Carlos Levy 2007 "Information Society and public ICT policies in the Caribbean: a review of advances and 
challenges, policy instruments and country experiences" ECLAC 
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3.3 CARICOM Barriers to Technology Access 
In 2004, the CARICOM Secretary General stated that after ten years of 
aggressive development policy that "it [was] difficult to conclude that they are now in a 
better position to achieve sustainable development" than they were in 1994. In fact he 
hazards that the opposite of that reality may be well be the case (Gray 2006). Just one 
year prior to this statement, Dr. the Hon. Keith C. Mitchell, Prime Minister of Grenada, 
in an address to the University of the West Indies, also advanced that the region was 
caught in a "low productivity trap". This trap he maintained was due to the inability of 
the region to engage in technologically innovative processes, in part due to a deficit in the 
necessary skills and knowledge. He emphasized that 
"Most of our countries do not have well resourced Science and Technology 
Councils, conducting research in areas critical to Caribbean development. Our 
numbers of scientists are declining, just at the time when we need a drastic 
increase in the quantity of these professionals. Legislation in many countries 
regarding Science, Research and Technology institutions and activities remains 
deficient. The number of technology-oriented institutions, including those with a 
strong technical component, is beginning to lag, even behind other countries in 
the Latin American Region." (Dr. the Hon. Keith C. Mitchell, Prime Minister, 
Grenada, 2003, address at the University of the West Indies). 
Drawing on the linkages between technology and productivity, CARICOM heads have 
realized that there is paucity in both these areas, hindering the creation of an 
economically viable space ready for the challenges of the new global economy. But 
understanding that there is a deficit in technology has done little in the way of solid 
comprehensive approaches. 
Recognition of this problem is only a small part of the wider developmental issue. 
It is important that CARICOM addresses the accompanied structural issues tied to lack of 
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technology access with a sense of cogency and directness. Admittedly this is difficult as 
these issues themselves, as previously outlined, are structural and rooted in processes that 
have been normalized, characteristic of a both a historical and international context, both 
of which are beyond the direct control of CARICOM states. Moreover dealing with many 
of these structural problems would require resources that are well beyond the means of 
the region, raising questions of priority and opportunity cost with regard to the 
implementation of ICTs, and evaluate whether it should be incorporated as part of a 
larger development strategy. Prime Minister Mitchell further stated that CARICOM, " 
desperately need[s] to address these issues in the shortest possible timeframe to unleash 
the potential that ICT makes possible" (CARICOM, 2003). 
Five years after Hon. Keith C. Mitchell's speech, CARICOM has made conscious 
efforts in investing in ICT development across the region. It is increasingly evident 
however that "return on this investment continues to fall below expectations" (CEPAL, 
2006). Like several of the CARICOM member states Jamaica has developed a national IT 
strategy with a primary objective of transitioning into a knowledge based society. The 
state provides loans for new IT start up firms from its technology fund and supplements 
new businesses in securing office facilities and physical infrastructure. 
In 2000 the Jamaican government funded three new call centres however; one of 
them, NET SERV, went into receivership after only six months of start up, costing the 
Jamaican government over $4 million US and calling into question the viability and 
volatility of the IT sector (ECLAC nd.: 341). Funding has presented quite the challenge, 
as CARICOM states find it hard to prioritize ICT issues, when arguably more pressing 
issues have demanded immediate attention. Table 11 gives an overview of the public 
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sector budget for select CARICOM national ICT budgets. CARICOM states are finding it 
difficult to establish universal access funds, which are budgets, set aside specifically for 
future ICT access initiatives. Much of these funds have been received from donor 
agencies, but have yet to be generated from state budgets. 

































































Adapted from: Carlos Levy 2007 'Information Society and public ICT policies in the 
Caribbean: a review of advances and challenges, policy instruments and country 
experiences' ECLAC 
Key 
1. Internal funds allocation within government agencies as opposed to formal 
allocation in public budget. 
2. Through Business/Technological Parks. 
3. Funds available for IT Strategy formulation. 
4. The Universal Access Fund has been redefined to be used for ICT in Education. 
5. Funds available for IT Strategy formulation and some specific projects. 
6. Technology Park and Clusters strategy under development. 
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With this in mind, this chapter will present data on the four factors that this 
research has hypothesized as having been most directly causal in both the lack of 
technology access and the inhibition of organic progressions to technology development. 
3.2 Technology Transfer and the TRIPS/TRIMS Agreements 
The ideological works on Caribbean technology within the early 60s and 70s 
came from voices such as economist Sir Arthur Lewis who strongly argued that for any 
country, technological change and not international trade, should be the engine of 
economic growth with "international trade serving as lubricating oil not fuel" (Lewis in 
Pantin,1987:3). Essentially Lewis was concerned with the generation of organic 
technology knowledge and capacity, not the type that would necessitate dependence on 
TNCs and foreign governments like today. This dependence, Girvan would later argue 
creates technological dysfunction and leads to a peipetuation of underdevelopment. 
Pantin (1987)14, also speaking on technology issues, highlighted nine core 
elements of the technology transfer for economic development paradigm and made a 
comparative analysis with the state of Caribbean technology development, with an 
emphasis on the development of Trinidad and Tobago's oil and natural gas sector. Some 
of these elements included established socioeconomic goals, with a clear vision for 
technology importation the creation of a multidisciplinary technology negotiating unit, 
the screening of technology importation activities so that they comply with element (1), 
implementation of human resource policies for continual technological growth and 
capacity. Table 10 refers to all of the aforementioned elements in protraction. These 
14 Note Pantin's use of technology does not refer to the specialized definition in this research, but 
instead encompasses all modes of production. 
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elements were essential in not only capturing technological innovations that were already 
established, but were also meant to ensure that it would push Caribbean states into co 
opting and developing their own technological capability (TC) and circumventing 
dependence. The weakness in Trinidad's response to technology transfer in the oil and 
gas sector in the late 70s is characteristic not only of the rest of the island but other 
Caribbean islands. 
The telecommunications industry in CARICOM, has until recently been almost 
completely monopolistic. Cable & Wireless is the largest telecommunications network 
provider in the region, having enjoyed dominance as the single telecommunications 
provider in several CARICOM states. Some of these arrangements allowing Cable and 
Wireless exclusive rights in some 
states were meant to last as long as 40 or more years (INFODEV, 2008). Currently some 
states have liberalized their markets including Jamaica, all of the OECS states, and 
Trinidad, phasing out UK based Cable and Wireless to embrace mobile companies such 
as 'Digicel' also UK based, as part of the WTO Basic Agreement on 
Telecommunications Services. 
While this liberalization has encouraged and improved mobile telephone rates, 
internet access is still relatively inaccessible as still the "majority of the population does 
not have internet access because the rates are too high" (ECLAC,nd:341), see Table 10 . 
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Table 10: ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO'S OIL 
AND NATURAL GAS SECTOR AGAINST NATIONAL TECHNICAL POLICY 
1. Identification of socio-economic goals 
and role of technology therein 
2. Creation of a multi-disciplinary 
technology planning unit 
3. Enactment of legislation and related 
monitoring agencies 
4. Human resource development 
5. Identification of specific products by 
demand analysis 
6. Analysis of impact of technical change 
7. Assessment of the technology market 
Development of the natural gas resource was tied to the 
objective of economic diversification and the provision 
of a substitute source of foreign exchange to that of the 
oil sector. There was no articulation of the role of 
technology. 
The Pt Lisas projects ware developed originally by the 
IDC. A small team of engineers formed the Coordinating 
Task Force, which was given responsibility at the critical 
stage of decision-making on most of the Pt. Lisas 
projects. The National Energy Corp. has been centrally 
involved in only the last two projects: Urea and 
Methanol in terms of decision-making. 
No specific legislation has been enacted for foreign 
investment or technology importation. Therefore, no 
related monitoring agencies exist. 
Some efforts were, and continue to be, made to develop 
national skills in the operation of the Pt. Lisas projects. 
However, there has been a significant foreign presence in 
the Iron and Steel Company. 
Products were first identified as technically feasible from 
natural gas. Demand (i.e. market analysis) was then 
undertaken by foreign consultants (table 3). 
No evidence was found of the appreciation of this issue. 
This was done by foreign consultants on behalf of the 
Government of Trinidad and Tobago (table3). 
8. Identification of enterprises to contract The Pt Lisas projects have been totally nationally owned 
with foreign vendors (ISCOTT, Urea, Methanol) or joint ventures BERTRIN, 
TRINGEN). However no evidence was found of the 
criteria used for the utilization of either form. Wholly 
nationally owned firms seem to have resulted in cases 
where no willing joint venture partner could be found. 
9. Continuous assessment There has been no attempt at public assessment of the 
decisions made at Pt. Lisas, except perhaps for public 
relations exercises. No evidence was found, moreover of 
any rigorous internal reappraisal. 
Source: Pantin 1987, "Technology policy in the development of Trinidad and Tobago's 
natural gas resource " 
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Table 11: SELECT CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES AND ICT PENETRATION 










































































Adapted from: Carlos Levy 2007 'Information Society and public ICT policies in the 
Caribbean: a review of advances and challenges, policy instruments and country 
experiences' ECLAC 
Liberalization of the telecommunications market while also important in creating 
an accessible environment for local IT companies to gain entrance, does not address the 
deficiencies in local companies actually engaging in local ICT adoption and adaptation. 
For example, while St. Lucia has enjoyed successful market penetration of mobile 
telephone communication reaching 83% of the population, the ITU noted that this IT 
growth has remained relatively isolated from other market segments and has not spilled 
over into other segments of the society. Moreover as most of the telecommunications and 
network providers are foreign based companies, CARICOM's technology dynamic is 
such that they are largely recipients of technologies from abroad but is neither a leader in 
design nor development. 
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Nonetheless complimentary local businesses and services have developed in 
response to the telecommunication industry and its increased growth. For example, 
mobile phone repair and accessory services have sprung up all around the region. In 
Haiti, Digicel's investment of over $lbillion dollars in telecommunications investments 
has made it the largest corporate investment there ever (Levy 2007). There has not been a 
strong presence of government in facilitating research and development and technology 
institutes across the region. Individually Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and Jamaica, 
have spearheaded slightly more robust schemes that the other smaller CARICOM states. 
Their resource base is larger allowing them more access to funds, research space and 
institutional support from local universities. Still these efforts have shown very little 
overall effect on local ICT access. 
3.4 Education Policies and Endogenous Technology Production 
"[Caribbean] School leavers—understood to be all pupils, including those that graduate 
successfully and those that leave school before completing a degree—often do not 
possess the skills required for the service jobs in the new global economy" (World Bank, 
2007: 7). 
The literacy rate and persons with basic education (primary and secondary school) 
attainment rate are both relatively high for the Caribbean region, see Table 11. This 
however does not speak to the quality of education, which of late has garnered a lot of 
criticism. Questions have been raised whether the education system has been preparing 
students for the new conditions of a knowledge based global system. In a 2007 World 
Bank report on the skill challenges in the Caribbean, it was found that with regard to the 
smaller eastern CARICOM states, who also align themselves as the Organisation of 
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Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) there were marked deficiencies in their education 
system. The report noted that these deficiencies were significant in that they did not 
prepare students for the vagaries of the new global economy. The four major problems in 
their findings were that: (1), students were still struggling with basic arithmetic and 
English language skills, (2) many had problems acquiring behavioral life skills such as 
team work, pro activity, critical thinking and effective communication; (3) most had not 
acquired sector specific professional skills such as ICT training, (4) most who received 
labour market training were the ones who were already highly skilled and many times 
others who did receive labour market training did not find it particularly useful as the 
areas were usually in low demand. They also noted that this was significant as the lack of 
skills reduced the ability of the region in gaining a competitive edge on the global 
markets. 
Banik, O'lyare, and Bhaumick (2006), all argue that there is significant waste in 
the Caribbean regional education system. They argue that the transition to regional 
tertiary and higher level education is limited and isolated three possible reasons. They see 
the lack of availability of spaces within technical and scientific disciples such as 
medicine, natural sciences and technology, as one reason. They postulate that deficiencies 
at the secondary level and the irrelevance of curricula to the current market demands as 
the two others. The region has tried to meet skill demands with the establishment of more 
technical institutions (see Table 12), and distance learning institutes. 
Within the OECS alone, the share of GDP by the service sector in total stands at 
79%, and contributes to over 50% for the rest of the Commonwealth, signifying the 
changes and shifts in the economy and the eventual demands of the labour force (World 
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Bank 2007). Moreover the report notes that there is no strong dialogue between the 
private sector and tertiary and secondary education policy makers, contributing to an in 
congruency in skill development and market demand (WB, 2007; UNESCO, 1999). This 
was especially true in the case of Barbados where a 1999 UNESCO survey indicated that 
students perceived career success through academic track careers, which was counter to 
the reality of a market demand for persons in the technical field. 
All of CARICOM governments have separately made attempts at developing 
conscious educational reform policies such as the OECS Reform Project and Barbados 
Education Sector Enhancement Programme, (EDuTech, 2000) initiative. All these 
initiatives have taken into consideration the changing needs of students, such as the 
adoption of computer literacy as a basic skill. Although most states have planned to 
provide a proportionate number of computers in all secondary and primary schools to 
provide access for all students, the venture is expensive, and is seen as a longer term goal. 
Barbados has in so far committed US 75 million financing provided through loans to see 
this happen (World Bank, 2005). When World Bank analysts calculated actual cost of the 
computers accounting only maintenance, they estimated that cost of acquiring the 
computers was only about one third of the real recurrent costs. The other two thirds they 
allocated for maintenance and repairs; however they did not figure in the cost of teacher 
training and of the construction for physical spaces (World Bank, 2005). 
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Table 12: HUMAN DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION INDICATORS FOR 















































































































Adapted from: Human Development Index UNDP 2007/2008 
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Table 13: CARIBBEAN DEGREE GRANTING INSTITUTIONS 




Trinidad and Tobago, 
St. Lucia, Antigua, 
Dominica, 
Grenada, St. Kitts, 


















Degree Granting Institution 
University of the West Indies (UWI) is 
a regional university funded by fourteen 
Governments of the Commonwealth 
Caribbean. 
University of Guyana 
The College of the Bahamas 
Northern Caribbean University 
University of Belize 
The University Council of Jamaica has 
a mandate to award degrees through 
programmes offered in Jamaican 
tertiary institutions 
University of Trinidad and Tobago 
The University of Technology 
Adapted from: Quality Assurance in Higher Education in the Commonwealth Caribbean, 
Miller (2002) 
Analysis of survey respondents in research conducted for this paper, "educators 
observed that students favored traditional academic subjects over those related to 
business and technical studies" (UNESCO 1999). In fact parents were instrumental in 
encouraging children to choose academic subjects based on the promise of a 'white collar 
career' and shy away from subjects that did not offer a culturally perceived future of 
"promise, reward, or glamour" as would those of an academic track. The report also 
concluded that the establishment of technical schools in the 1980s "reinforced the 
perception that technical training was the option for marginally performing students or 
low academic aptitude. The research also indicated that the there is a strong disjuncture 
between "modern needs of global capital and the need to prepare students accordingly" 
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and that local industry does not create specific demand on secondary education (p. 12). 
Levy 2007 argues that, the Caribbean education system faces the challenges in revamping 
its methodologies, contents, programs and environments, which are critical in providing 
citizens with the new skills in order to be competitive and to maximize productivity in the 
new knowledge economy. 
3.5 Migration and the Brain Drain 
As mentioned before, migration has been a distinctive feature in the Caribbean 
development psyche. This is in part because of the length and breadth of migratory 
movements that today have shaped the regions' behaviors and reinforced cultural norms 
in a "dynamic that tends to perpetuate the process rather than exhaust it" (ILO Thomas 
Hope, 2005:3). For example, it is almost a rite of passage for young Caribbean nationals 
with the means to 'go to school' after A Levels, an implication which usually denotes 
moving to a metropole country for higher education. Early migratory patterns paralleled 
the direction of foreign investment in the region, for example the building of the 
Panama Canal, the Central American railroads and the general post World war 
reconstruction in the U.S and Western Europe (Thomas- Hope, ILO Caribbean Migration 
Papers:4). Today majority Caribbean migrant flows are tending toward developed 
countries, who themselves have established aggressive recruiting drives for skilled and 
educated professionals to fill their labour demands. 
Between 1956 and 2006, the Caribbean has lost roughly 5 million people to 
migration, with Suriname, Jamaica, Guyana and Saint Lucia, as the largest source 
countries (United Nations Expert group on Migration and Development, 2005:2). As a 
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percentage this figure represents a large portion of Caribbean population. Table 
14 is a statistical representation of data showing migrant flows in real numbers and as a 
population percentage. The majority of countries in the Caribbean Basin showed a 
marked increase in migration (some even double) between 1999 and 2000. Specifically 
within CARICOM all states with the exception of Trinidad and Tobago, Montserrat and 
Jamaica showed increases in migration. The Caribbean average percentage to population 
migration rate was only 0.02 less than the world average and higher than the whole of the 
Latin America region. 
Table 14: DATA ON POPULATION AND MIGRATION FROM THE 2000 
REVISION OF WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS 
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St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Turks and Caicos 
Islands 











































































































































Adapted from United Nations Secretariat, Population Division Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs 
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What is quite puzzling is that despite the sheer expansiveness of the problem 
Caribbean states have been slow to act making very little clear policy statements on 
stemming migration issues. Table 14 shows both the views and responses of CARICOM 
governments on emigration in 1996 and 2000. Some efforts have been made in creating 
managed migration programs, particularly in the health sector as this is where the 
Caribbean loses a vast majority of workers to the U.K, Canada and the U.S. This 
programme however is small and does not capture enough of the workers who leave. Jean 
Yan (2006) chief scientist of nursing and midwifery for the World health Organization 
noted that the Caribbean suffered a loss of public investment in training nurses in the area 
of US $16.7 million in 2000 and an additional US$13.5 million by 2003, due to migration 
(2006). Yan claims that the nurses left behind then become overworked and underpaid, 
now having to pick up the extra burden of those who have left; leaving tired and angry 
nurses. Yan contemplates that it will take almost 5 years or more to restore the 
Caribbean's nursing staff. The number of migrants moving to developed countries is just 
as important as the demographic of that population. More than any other region, migrants 
from the Caribbean region are generally the highest educated of all migrant flows to 
OECD countries. As table 3 illustrated on average, 70 percent of emigrants to OECD 
countries from CARICOM states have received tertiary education and another 42 % with 
secondary education. The significant loss of skilled labour to CARICOM has presented 
several challenges. 
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Table 15: CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS AND POLICIES ON 
EMIGRATION, 1996 AND 2000 





























Adapted from United Nations Secretariat, Population Division Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs 
Table 16: PERCENT OF LABOR FORCE THAT HAS MIGRATED 
TO OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES, 1965-2000 (BY LEVEL OF 
SCHOOLING) 
Country 










St. Kitts and Nevis 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent and 
Grenadines 
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Adapted from IMF Working Paper Emigration and Brain Drain: Evidence from 
the Caribbean 2005 
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One of the more critical issues with such a significant loss of skilled professionals 
is the loss of government expenditure by CARICOM states in producing these skilled 
migrants. Table 16 provides a tabular representation of this loss, while Figure 1 illustrates 
the amount CARICOM specific spends on education as a percentage of their GDP. 
Tertiary level averages were obtained for Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago as 
they are currently the only states with full degree granting institutions from the 
University of the West Indies. 
Table 17: GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION, AVERAGE 
1999-2002 
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Adapted from United Nations Education Scientific and Cultural Organization, 
(UNESCO) in IMF Working Paper Emigration and Brain Drain: Evidence from the 
Caribbean 2005 
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Of the top producing skilled and educated professional, migrant countries 
CARICOM states are within the top 20 in the world. Figure 2 provides a graphical 
representation of this data. Almost all CARICOM states are within the top 20 of these 
countries. Moreover as compared with the rest of the world, the Caribbean by far between 
1965 and 2000 has had the largest percentage of persons immigrating to OECD countries 
as Figure 3 will show. 
Figure 1: ESTIMATED GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON 
EDUCATION OF MIGRANTS (IN PERCENTAGE OF GDP) 
Adapted from IMF Working Paper Emigration and Brain Drain: Evidence from the 
Caribbean 2005 
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Figure 2: TOP 20 COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD WITH THE HIGHEST 
EMIGRATION RATES, 1970-2000 









































































































































Adapted from Docquier and Marfouq (2005) in IMF Working Paper Emigration 
and Brain Drain; Evidence from the Caribbean 2005 in Mishra 2005 
(Note: Educated labor force is defined as having 12 or more years of 
completed schooling) 
116 
Figure 3: PERCENT OF LABOR FORCE THAT HAS MIGRATED 
TO OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES 
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Adapted from Docquier and Marfouq (2004) in IMF Working Paper Emigration and 
Brain Drain: Evidence from the Caribbean 2005 in Mishra 2005 
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Figure 4: PERCENT OF LABOR FORCE THAT HAS MIGRATED FROM 
THE CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES TO OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES 
1965-2000 
el? v ^ # AS" 
Adapted from IMF Working Paper Emigration and Brain Drain: Evidence from the 
Caribbean 2005 
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Within CARICOM, the countries with the record of having the largest percentage 
of emigrant lost to OECD countries can be further correlated to the current level of 
development of technology. This will be further elaborated on in the following chapter. 
Intraregional labour flows have not had a significant impact on CARICOM economies, as 
generally the demographic of these migrants reflect unskilled workers moving from states 
of extremely low economic activity such as Haiti to islands of higher economic activity 
such as Trinidad (there has been limited data on actual intraregional flows). Although the 
free movement of labour is a feature of the new Caribbean Single Market Agreement, this 
clause has been the least readily accepted, with states (and righdy so) concerned about 
the effects that an influx of low skill and low wage demanding labour, could have on 
their indigenous labour force. 
In figure 4 one can see that, three quarters of all of CARICOM has lost at least 
20% and more of the labour force to migration to OECD countries in the last 40 years. 
The smaller OECS grouping within CARICOM has had a significantly larger rate of 
migration at 50%, 46%, 39%, and 35% for Grenada, Skitts and Nevis, Dominica, and St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines respectively. Noticeably, the Caribbean's loss of skilled 
labour also coincided with the boom period in the information and communication sector 
in the early 1990s. The following chapter will continue with a detailed analysis on the 
relationship between migration and the lack of ICT access. 
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Chapter 4 - RECONCILING THE IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS 
ON TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 Assessing the Successes of CARICOM ICT Initiatives 
"The often cited positive impact of ICT on social and political processes have yet to be 
felt in the (Caribbean) region " (Levy 2007:8). 
Almost all of CARICOM is engaged in national ICT policy development to some 
degree. Despite these initiatives dating as far back as 2000, see Table 8, many 
CARICOM states are still in very premature stages of their ICT development. As Table 7 
and 8 indicate, even though CARICOM states have created coordinating agencies to 
facilitate their ICT strategies, only Jamaica had made specific budgetary allocations for 
universal ICT access and implementation. As such Jamaica and Trinidad's advancements 
in ICT implementation are more advanced; particularly Jamaica, which has moved into 
the second phase of their ICT formulation, see Table 6. 
Several policy documents have been created, yet with limited budgetary support. 
Caribbean governments have not been able to make ICTs a priority, while those who 
have, have made little linkages between the use of ICTs and its use in all levels of 
Caribbean society. For example, an examination of the 2006 St. Lucian ICT development 
strategy reported that ICTs had not been developed as a government strategy nor was any 
consultation made with the private sector. This can be counterproductive as sustainable 
ICT and technology development has to be driven by market demand not through policy. 
There is a definite sense of urgency in the Caribbean, as states understand their 
increasing disadvantage in creating efficiency with current economic processes, as well 
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as becoming even more productive and competitive with future economic possibilities. 
As such, as we saw in the previous chapter, on the heels of the liberalization of the 
telecommunications industry, Barbados, Trinidad, Jamaica, and the OECS states, all 
embarked on new technology initiatives, particularly in education. Because many of the 
initiatives are recent, it is difficult to determine fully if they have been successful or not. 
What this research has found however, is that many of the policies governing these ICT 
initiatives, have not incorporated nor anticipated the constraints of both endogenous and 
exogenous factors that implicitly prohibit technology access in developing countries and 
within CARICOM specifically. There has been a strong emphasis on education, which 
admittedly is essential in harnessing ICT potential; however the education policies do not 
reflect the need to address social attitudes to technical and business education. 
4.2 Implications ofNeoliberal Globalization on Technology Development 
"The phenomenon of globalization has emerged as a dominant feature of contemporary 
international economic relations. At the same it has accentuated the polarization between 
the developed and developing countries as they seek to defend and promote competing 
interests" (Benn, 2004:21) 
As individual concepts, neither globalization nor neoliberalism can singularly 
claim responsibility for the ills that Benn (2004) has alluded to. Instead these to 
principles en tandem have resulted in a dynamic of praxis, based primarily on the 
principles of private enterprise, the laws of comparative advantage and deregulated 
international trade, and the absence of state involvement in market activity and 
regulation. These principles are exercised through economic activities that have also 
coincided with the globalising of cultures, economies, states and governments. In essence 
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neoliberal ideology was given the free access of markets activity, and was limited only by 
the technological capabilities of the day. The most important reason we focus on 
globalization, aside from its very definitive effects, is that it is "creating winners and 
losers at the international level", with the losers in general far outweighing the winners 
(Woods, 2000:9). 
The emergence of small nation states after the decolonization period, has 
presented several challenges. States as small as Montserrat with a population of only 
12,000 have had to contend with imperial powers such as the United States with a 
population of 300 million and a GDP several times over. Not just competition from the 
west but small nation states like CARICOM faces several competition challenges on the 
international arena, with countries such as China and India, whose economic production 
is manned by a population a billion strong. 
The small island developing states (SIDS) in CARICOM are particularly 
vulnerable to the shocks of the international community because they hold such little 
sway in according any satisfactory terms of trade. In fact the Secretary General of 
CARICOM in 1994 noted that the running problem in the Caribbean is a need for 
"special consideration to assist them in building resilience to external and internal shocks 
and to organize in order to reduce constraints the impact of their inherent constraints to 
sustainable development" (Gray, 2006:16). His reference to 'inherent constraints' is 
essential to understanding the fundamental issues with regard to Caribbean development, 
in that the obstacles they face are not as easily solved through influxes of money or 
foreign investment as many economists would suggest. Instead these obstacles have 
arisen from age old inequitable power imbalances that are entrenched in the activities of 
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the global economy. No one can deny that the interests of the governments of rich 
countries and their transnational corporations are realized more often than not, through 
double standards and unfair trading rules that developing countries can rarely renegotiate. 
Developing countries infrequently realize full profit on goods in which they have 
a comparative advantage. Many developing countries have been traditional producers of 
raw materials, which has historically always gained lower prices on the world market as 
opposed to manufactured goods. Unless there is economic refashioning of trade rules and 
power balances, approaching poverty and material deprivation (including digital 
deprivation) through alleviation strategies is counter- productive. Take the example of the 
United States and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries debacle over the 
Lome conventions in the WTO. The US consistently bargained for expulsion of 
preferential treatment for ACP countries' agricultural produce that previously was 
supplied to the EU on a guaranteed quota basis. The preferential treatment was 
successfully disbanded under the General Agreements of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
subsequent Uruguay rounds, formally liberalizing EU markets and removing any 
protection the Caribbean and other ACP countries enjoyed. One can imagine the state of 
agricultural produce in the region since the protectivist policies were removed. Sugar 
earnings in Barbados for example by 2007/2008 would drop by almost 40%. One has to 
question whether the US truly feared competition from states as small as Barbados or 
whether, the protectionist policies represented defiance to the neoliberal agenda 
(something the US would not stand for). 
This is an example of the incidence of US dominance and the lack of negotiating 
abilities of not just CARICOM, but all of the ACP states. Their decisions are even more 
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limited than their choices which do not bode well for a region hoping to enter a new 
economy (the information economy) based on the terms of developed countries. 
It is impossible to isolate all the negative impacts neoliberalism and globalization 
has on the economic development on the Caribbean; however with regard to technology 
access we can isolate some direct processes that have in so far made the acquisition and 
adaption of technology difficult. As Chapter 3 indicated the rise of the IFIs such as the 
World Bank, World Trade Organization, and the International Monetary Fund as having 
tremendous political dominion over national economic policies has led to the 
proliferation of destructive packaged economic policies with adverse lasting impacts. 
Secondly the rise of free markets and false choice in engaging in the neoliberal global 
economy has led small developing states like those in the Caribbean forced to compete 
with large transnational corporations and developed states with much more highly 
mechanized and efficient production systems, not to mention the extreme disadvantage in 
capital. 
As we can see from Chapter 3, Tables 4 and 5, structural adjustment policies in 
the 1980s have had the lasting effects of producing high external and public debt in 
CARICOM. This was in order to finance industrial schemes, as was laid out in the SAP 
policy packages. Concurrently money was siphoned away from public spending on social 
spending like education. This debt has simply snowballed over the last decades, as 
governments continue to borrow money to finance social reformation schemes, which 
have been recognized as undeniably necessary in creating a highly skilled human 
resource base for the needs of knowledge, based global economy. The reticence of 
CARICOM states in allocating monies left after debt servicing to ICT development is 
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understandable. The lasting effects of the structural adjustment period in having a 
negative impact on real incomes is evident, as per capita incomes in some CARICOM 
states such as Jamaica, Guyana and Haiti have gone down significantly since SAPs were 
instituted. This is important as with regard to ICT access, as states where per capita 
incomes, ICT access will invariably be lower. Persons are much less willing to purchase 
communication technologies when they have little disposable income. 
What we can also glean from the SAPs and the international political fora, is that 
the ability of developing countries and CARICOM to negotiate terms of trade, favorable 
financial loans and investments has been extremely limited. Particularly as these 
negotiations have been and are being done under the ideological parameters of 
neoliberalism. Biased free market policies have led to the region losing substantively in 
trade negotiations over the goods they have comparative advantage. The WTO has 
institutionalized the attempts of developed countries in ascertaining their dominance in 
the current international political economy (IPE). Through the WTO agreements, the 
false choice of free market adoption has pushed CARICOM states to compete with 
companies such as Dole and Chiquita. It is also allowed framework for the ability of 
foreign companies to pay low wages and depress local business, as well as the dumping 
goods into Caribbean markets at prices that local producers cannot compete. The overall 
result is an inability for CARICOM states to become truly competitive on a global scale. 
Although many CARICOM states have increased their service sector share in 
relation to their overall contribution to national GDPs (with service industries on average 
accounting for over 50% of the GDPs of some member states, and over 70% in others), 
many CARICOM states such as Dominica, Jamaica, Guyana, Belize and Saint Lucia still 
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rely heavily on agriculture, as you can see from the data in Table 1. The central call of 
neoliberalism and globalization is a restructuring of economies from highly intensive 
knowledge driven and high innovative technologies (Watson, 1994:68). As the Caribbean 
has been so highly engaged in agricultural pursuits, the change to this type of economic 
activity currently is slow. Restructuring requires a strong social reformation strategy as 
well as an economic one, yet the concept of changing ideas and attitudes toward business, 
work, and education in CARICOM have also been slow. 
Not investing in technology is not an option if CARICOM is to maintain decent 
levels of development. As the global economy continues to organize itself around the 
commoditization of knowledge, it will become imperative for CARICOM states to 
increase their orientation with information communication technologies as a user and as a 
creator. Therefore if CARICOM does not make active attempts at establishing an 
authoritative presence in the global economy, with particular regard to negotiating trade 
terms, opportunities to create favorable terms will be lost. The dictators of globalization 
have so far been the countries who have become the exporters of technology. While 
CARICOM cannot completely delink from the current global system, nor can it 
completely change the outcomes, therefore it is imperative to understand that any long 
term technology policy has to be written with a practical understanding of their future 
technological and economic goals with regard to their orientation in the global economy. 
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4.3 Implications of Education on CARICOMICT Development 
More than any other region, the Caribbean's survival is highly dependent on the 
development of its people. As such, education has remained the primary method in which 
to develop their human resource. Currently education has had to take on a more 
substantive meaning, requiring that the region to invest in pedagogical strategies that 
embody the changing economic and technological demands of the global economy. 
Koelher and Segal (1987), Benn (2000), noted that this ability to produce a human 
resource adept at technological capabilities and innovations has overall been quite slow. 
They articulated that the reason the region is experiencing such a slow or significant 
progression of its endogenous science and technology (S&T) development is largely due 
to the historical factors such as colonialism. 
The remnants of colonialism are proving stubbornly difficult to erase. Colonial 
attitudes such as an elitist bias within the education system toward law have translated to 
a contemporary bias for law and other subjects within the humanities as opposed to more 
technical areas such as IT, and engineering. While the costs to obtain a professional 
degree in IT or a technical field is comparatively the same (an indication of the market 
value of technical degrees), there is a second issue of lack of availability. Within 
CARICOM there are very few degree granting institutions for persons majoring in 
science and technical fields. It is only more recently that governments have made 
concerted efforts in focusing on their state curriculum development in placing more 
emphasis on both science and technical subjects, with initiatives such as the addition of 
computer labs to all secondary schools, the creation of technical schools, and the 
promotion of distance learning. 
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The region however has seen the effects of neocolonialism, with regard to "[t]he 
globalization of knowledge," "Western culture constantly reaffirms the West's view of 
itself as the centre of legitimate knowledge, and the arbiter of what counts as knowledge 
and the source of 'civilized' knowledge"(Linda, 2006:5). This largely affects the 
migratory patterns of many Caribbean nationals to developed seeking higher education, 
rejecting regional institutions, on the premise of seeking a more 'recognized' education. 
Koehler and Segal argue that within the tertiary level of Caribbean's education 
system, there have been some significant attempts at research and development. In 
particular, the University of the West Indies, the region's oldest and largest degree 
granting institution, however has also not been able to create suitable networks that 
would allow direct knowledge flows of research and development to industry and other 
appropriate sectors, instead much of the technology (in the forms of machinery) used in 
the region is still directly and largely imported. Like educational institutes, much of the 
local technology is not legitimized and not institutionalized even though Girvan, Patel 
argue its appropriateness and adaptation would lead to more productivity. 
Basic education levels are significantly high for the region however they are not 
concentric within science and technology, nor are they supported by investments in local 
R&D. Thus the region is losing a significant link in their orientation with technology and 
their population, leading to a wider digital divide. 
The only country within CARICOM with adult literacy levels at below 50 % is 
Haiti at 49%15.With the exception of Guyana and Jamaica; all other CARICOM states 
have achieved adult literacy rates from 80% to 100%, although Barbados is the only state 
with 100% adult literacy rates. Relatively speaking, literacy rates are at an acceptable 
15 2004 
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level, though enrollment rates for all levels of education overall are still low in Haiti, 
Trinidad and Tobago and St. Vincent, see Table 12. With regard to education there are 
three important issues that this research isolates as having a direct contribution to 
technology access issues. First, as the data suggests curriculum development within 
CARICOM education is such that it does not provide a solid foundation for the 
requirements (such as basic computer literacy) of a knowledge society. Secondly, 
attitudes toward education are still rooted in colonial and elitists behaviors where 
technical areas are perceived as less valuable as professional and white collar areas. 
Over the last two decades, CARICOM has invested quite extensively in 
education, creating partnerships with UNESCO and the World Bank to research and 
develop strategy papers. Out of this research, the most prominent conclusion was that 
CARICOM education curriculum had a deficit in meeting the demands of the changing 
labour market. As CARICOM continues to expand and move into larger service 
providing economies see Table 1, the dynamic of the labour force has not caught up with 
this change. The market value and entrepreneurial benefits of subjects such as business 
studies and information communication technology, has not been communicated to 
students, partly because there is no strong dialogue between the private sector and its 
demands and the provisions within the education system. With the market demand and 
education supply functioning independently, the resulting in congruency has resulted in a 
labour market that is not; (1) using technology tools of innovation to create new business 
and production strategies, (2), becoming themselves a highly innovative and 
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technologically capable group. Both of which will hinder CARICOM in becoming more 
aligned with the changing IPE16. 
This issue is undoubtedly cyclical. As noted in the previous chapter local (small 
and big) business tend not to make any specific demands of secondary students, in part 
because the businesses themselves are risk averse and do not engage in extensive 
innovative practices. Economists argue that to successfully transition out of the current 
non innovation cycle and over-dependence on current basic commodity exports, requires 
a move towards new markets sustainable growth potential, means investing into higher-
value as well as niche markets, both of which require an educated, innovative and 
technologically skilled labour force, in order also to be competitive with more developed 
markets (Wehrmeyer, Chenoweth, Clayton, Fernandez-Lopez, Lum, 2004). 
Technical and commerce education has been under prioritised, in large part due to 
the aversive attitudes toward this type of school, stemming from colonial elitism. Instead 
CARICOM colonial heritage, have made them more partial to grammar type education 
(Lewis and Lewis, 1985). Caribbean Colonial education at the time of slavery was geared 
toward white plantation owners, with the idea of future resettlement in their respective 
motherlands' and even then had a very little scientific component. Post emancipation 
education, when opened up to the majority ex-slave population, catered to meeting the 
clerical needs of the civil service. Contemporary Caribbean education is still structured 
around this ideology, with business and vocational/technical subjects seen as having less 
future reward. This culture and idea has been reinforced as students in technical and 
vocational schools have lower requirements upon entrance. 
16 For example lack of medical technicians to operate X-Ray machines etc. result in unnecessarily 
long wait times and expensive machinery left unused. 
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All CARICOM states have tried to put in more computers in their secondary 
schools, in order to try to encourage basic literacy in students. This venture is expensive 
and so far most states have only been able to put in a small number of computers. 
Barbados however has made an exceptional effort in putting in computers in schools, 
taking on a World Bank loan of almost $US 75 million dollars. The real costs however of 
inputting, maintaining the computers' hardware and software, as well as training and 
paying personnel and building proper infrastructure, is accounted as substantially more 
than the $75 million. For many of the smaller CARICOM states with far less income and 
existing debt, this type of investment although necessary is difficult. Moreover it is also 
difficult for governments to rationalize loans of such magnitude to their citizens, for 
computers when many are unconvinced of their utility in schools. 
It is clear therefore that within CARICOM the residual colonial attitudes to 
technical education are a constraint to developing a sound technological base. Unless 
governments can make stronger connections between the changing labour market needs 
and the current curriculum, this attitude will continue to undermine any future ICT 
projects. Governments must engage in dialogue that is mindful of the responsibility of the 
current and more importantly the future needs of CARICOM in meeting the demands of 
global economy. Education is a part of the structure with which a society can propel itself 
into a stage of modernity based on information as is now. The disjuncture between 
education and technological innovation is wide enough that it would make expensive ICT 
projects seem a waste of money. 
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4.4 Implications of the Brain Drain and Human Resource Scarcity ofCARICOMICT 
Development 
Contemporary migration is fundamentally similar to that of any migratory 
movements of the past. Within the Caribbean context, and that of most other developing 
countries, it has taken the shape of people moving from countries with low economic 
activity to countries of higher economic activity, where there is the possibility of creating 
economic prosperity. Nurse (2006) argues that today migration can be "explained by two 
contemporary global imbalances: the widening socio-economic polarization (i.e. 
widening income gap and the divergence of quality of living)". The other imbalance is 
the "relative ageing of the population in the north and the need for replacement labour" 
(Nurse, 2006:368). 
Nurse argues that the shortage of labour in the OECD countries, and the need for 
replacement labour has led developed countries to turn to migration as a source of human 
capital. This need for labour has created the 'pull factors' (the factors which attract 
migrants to developed countries). Massive unemployment, poverty, hunger, lack of 
development of social services as a result of what Nurse attributes to a "decline in global 
value added as a consequence of implementing structural adjustment programmes and the 
negative effect of neo-liberal restructuring" (Jeffrey, 2006) created the 'push factors' 
(factors which compel migrants to leave their countries). 
Jeffrey Williamson of the IMF noted that between 1999 and 2001 the Caribbean 
lost 10.8 million people due to migration all across the world. Comparatively "[t]he 
Caribbean region has borne the deepest and most continuous impact from international 
migration of any region in the world" (Aaron & Barry, 1987: 41-45). This considerable 
loss to Caribbean society has forced attention to the possible impact this has had on the 
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progress of socioeconomic development and the contribution to a lack of technology 
development. 
One critical effect of migration has been the loss of highly skilled labour, in a 
phenomenon labeled as the 'brain-drain'. Nurse argues that the percentages of highly 
skilled migrants with tertiary education are particularly high for the Caribbean. In 1990 
41.7 percent of Jamaicans who migrated had tertiary education, Trinidad and Tobago had 
a 46.7 percent share and Guyana a 40.7 percent. Francis Bourguignon stated that "over 40 
percent of people with university education who were born in the Caribbean countries 
now live outside of their country of birth" (Nurse, 2006). The implications of this one 
can imagine are quite negative, especially on a country's socio-economic development. 
Bourguignon sees the loss of this large group of skilled persons translates to a loss of 
"positive externalities generated by highly skilled workers in a developing economy, it 
also reduces the capacity to deliver key services that are important for economic and 
social development". Literacy services are just one example of the key variables 
necessary in promoting a society that can be driven by and knowledge and information 
communication. 
From the data presented in the previous section we can see that CARICOM more 
than any other region in the world exports a significant number of skilled and educated 
migrant to developing countries. At a rate of only 0.02 percent less than the global rate, 
the migration rate in the region is clearly an issue that has left a lasting impact on several 
sectors of Caribbean society. More specifically with regard to technology access, 
migration has two specific negative effects; it becomes a significant loss of expenditure 
for governments with already scarce resources and extensive external debts, and it is 
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socially inhibitive in organic technology creation as qualified persons leave for other 
opportunities. 
Based on the data presented in Table 16, between 1965 and 2000 CARICOM 
countries such as Suriname lost as high as 89 percent of their tertiary educated labour 
force to migration to OECD countries, in an increasing trend over the last 20 years; even 
doubling for some states like Jamaica and Grenada. This has presented a significant skill 
loss for the region signifying a "net transfer of human capital and scarce resources" 
(Burns and Mohaptra, 2008: 1). CARICOM bears the cost of educating these migrants, 
therefore their loss represents, the cost of educating each individual, as well as forgone 
taxation from future income generation, and forgone revenue generation if individuals 
remained to start new business enterprises and engaged in economic activity. 
Jamaica and Barbados subsidize tertiary education, which accounts to 62% of the 
per capita GDP per student. For other CARICOM territories subsidizing secondary 
education is also heavily subsidized, as seen in table 17, Dominica spends 35%, St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines 28% and Belize 19%. States like St. Lucia as a percentage of 
their whole GDP spend a critical 14% on education between 1999 and 2000 alone. 
Keeping in mind these states are lower income earning states with large external debts. 
Methodologically migration can be analogized to dropping money in a bucket with a 
whole in the bottom, as migrants enrich the economic and social development of their 
receiving countries as opposed to their own. 
While not the focus of this research it is important to note that there has been 
much debate over the issue of the inflow of remittances to the Caribbean. Remittances are 
described as all monies sent from migrant workers back to their home country (DFJD, 
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2002). This trend has increased substantially, becoming the second largest capital flow to 
developing countries, after foreign direct investments, and way before official 
development assistance(ODA) at 260% of ODA ;"regionally Latin America and the 
Caribbean receive the lion share of remittances in nominal terms", DFID (2002). 
Remittances serve as both a source of income and a balance to the costs governments' 
bear when migrants leave. Though substantial, remittances are not a practical 
development tool as is being purported. The sheer magnitude of this capital flow has 
many states, faltering on more aggressive migration issues. It is clear that 
"the total losses due to skilled migration (which includes the "emigration loss," 
externality effects, and government expenditure on educating the migrants) outweigh the 
recorded remittances for the Caribbean region on average, and for almost all the 
individual Caribbean countries. (Mishra, 2005:5-6). 
Monies gained from remittances however are neither sustainable nor a desirable 
replacement for the loss in labour, skills, knowledge, culture and money spent on 
educating each migrant. In fact acceptance of remittances as a source of income negates 
the negative impacts of migration on CARICOM development, as is an implicit reminder 
of the factors that lead to migration in the first place. For more comprehensive 
background information to this issue one can refer to Mishra, 2005; Bourguignon, 2006; 
Louise Berg, 2004; Wendell, 2005; Orozco, 2003; and Portes, 2007. 
With regard to technological progress, emigration of professionals such as 
engineers and medical technicians and professionals who directly impact production, may 
result in reduced rates of domestic innovation and technology adoption" (Kapur and 
McHale, in Burns and Mohaptra, 2008: 2). Scholars such as Cline in chapter two argued 
that theoretically, integral to the technological development process is the sociotechnical 
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systems of manufacture, which incorporate the social components of science and 
technology development. The most important social component in this process is people. 
Therefore the loss of skilled persons in the development of more complex technology 
production and or adaptation can be an inhibiting factor. In the case of CARICOM we 
can extrapolate therefore that along with other handicaps such a scarce resources, the loss 
of skilled technical persons is a significant contributing factor to the continued lack of 
technology accumulation in the region. 
In an awareness of migration as a development issue of such consequence, we can 
understand that to preclude migration in any technology dialogue and subsequent policy, 
on both a regional and national level within CARICOM, will be to the folly of member 
states and ultimately lead to unsuccessful ICT initiatives and reconstitute the digital 
divide and lack of technology access. 
4.3 Implications of Technology Transfer on Technology Infrastructure 
"the initial optimism about development via imported technology has turned out to be 
'profoundly misplaced' and that policies based on these early views will continue to 
hinder rather than promote industrial development and 'catching up'" (Bell and Pavitt 
in James ,2004:2). 
Another instance where external factors have given the Caribbean region little 
opportunity in raising their technological capacity is with regards to technology transfers. 
This issue is closely linked with neoliberal globalization (one can say as a direct 
consequence of even), but on its own presents very serious challenges to the Caribbean. 
According to Benn (2000), The proliferation of supranational organizations such as the 
WTO, ILO and the United Nations, has become an extension to a current global 
economic system, where preexisting forms of economic activity relegated within state 
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boundaries have been 'multilateralised' and given supraterritorial jurisdiction. This has 
done nothing to advance the position of developing countries; one could argue rather that 
it is developed countries that have mostly benefited. 
Currently technology transfers to developing countries represent the most 
prevalent method for accessing technologies from developed countries. This is in part 
because countries in the south generally do not have the capital and human resource 
capacity to invest in extensive research and development (R&D), "in fact the South[still] 
remains ill equipped to locally research, and produce modern technologies" (Bardouille 
1998:80). Developing countries rely heavily on the foreign physical technologies, 
knowledge capacities, and assistance in maintenance, training etc. for equipment. 
What has arisen from this arrangement are a set of unfair rules and agreements 
with regard to how these technologies can be used within recipient countries. Economist 
Dr. Norman Girvan (2005:3), drawing on Surendra Patel's extensive research on 
technology transfers, argued that "the contracts and practices of multinational companies 
were rife with restrictions whose objective was precisely to prevent the transfer of 
technology to users". He argued that primarily these contractual agreements were 
intended to prolong use, restrict assimilation, restrict local adaptation, and to magnify 
social cost. All of which would summarily discourage the technologies acculturative 
absorption. Negotiations of TRIPS agreements have neither produced more development 
friendly clauses, nor have they fostered true technology transfer. Instead many 
technology transfer contracts are mostly prohibitive in developing states obtaining true 
technological assimilation, for future productive use. 
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A long colonial period saw much of the technology being used transferred into the 
region from its colonial rulers as well as its light adaptation to agriculture for the sole 
purpose of mono crop export that would benefit the region's mother metropole (the 
colonial territories were Britain, Spain, France and the Netherlands). They have not had 
the gradual evolution of indigenous innovation and investments in research and 
development (R&D). Originally used mostly for extractive purposes, the region's sole 
purpose was for the creation of profit gains for its metropoles. Transfers of technology 
were simply for industrial purposes and were not co-opted into other sectors of the 
society. Today many scholars would argue that this tradition of technology transfer 
denied the region a natural progression to gaining an aptitude for science and technology. 
Unfortunately contemporary technology transfer is similarly restrictive. Girvan 
notes that in the 1970s a study on Jamaica showed that 67 percent of contractual 
agreements on technology had secrecy and confidentiality clauses, while 15 percent had 
grant back clauses and another 65 percent with clauses that preventing the use of 
technologies past the agreements' expiry dates. Also with regard to the physical 
equipment that is imported (which many times are old, second hand and in disrepair) 
neither the patents nor the expertise in maintenance of the equipment is shared with the 
Caribbean, perpetuating the cycle of dependence on knowledge and expertise from 
developed countries. These clauses indicate the bargaining position of these Caribbean 
states and developing countries at large, having no ability to determine more favorable 
terms. Summarily "TRIPS reinforces the technologically dominant positions of [these] 
firms and reduces the pressure on them to share technology" (Girvan, 2005:5). 
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Technology transfers play a direct role in contributing to the digital divide in that 
the dependence on external technology acquisition leads to the "underdevelopment of 
local technology and an application of inappropriate production techniques", both of 
which reinforce a cyclical need for more imported technology, as potential investment 
into local R&D and or education is subverted. It certainly perpetuates a divide between 
those who lead in innovation and those who merely receive it. 
For developing countries to transition from low income earners to high income 
earners it is essential for them to invest in endogenous technological capabilities and 
increase their technological capacity (Manfred 2008), Surendra Patel Memorial Lecture 
Saint Mary's University, October 30 ). For small developing states this is exceptionally 
difficult as discussed in the previous section, their ability to be competitive and generate 
the necessary revenue for research and development, and technologically advanced 
pursuits are extremely limited. CARICOM has relied quite heavily on foreign direct 
investment and technology transfers as their main source of technological advancement 
particularly in the telecommunications sphere. While technology transfers in and of them 
are not negative processes, as many developed and developing countries have benefited 
immensely from them, they do encourage the regression of local technology adaptation. 
As noted in Chapter 3, the Caribbean has mostly been party to monopolistic 
telecommunications arrangements with foreign based companies. The previous lack of 
competition allowed companies to become comfortable in providing basic services at 
high costs. Also barring local companies from participating in the local 
telecommunication industry. As we saw from the example of Pantin's assessment of 
technology absorption within the oil and gas sector in Trinidad Table 10, in general 
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Caribbean states have not developed long term technology policies nor have they made 
the linkages between technologies and their adaptation for use in other areas. Also the use 
of expensive foreign consultants on many government projects as noted in Table 10, 
perpetuates the inability of; one, the ability for states to cultivate and invest in their own 
knowledge and skills and two, the ability of states in adapting technologies to the 
Caribbean environment in order to maximize the outcomes. 
Foreign direct investment can be elemental to countries with very little capital for 
their own research and development. However the caveat remains that FDI in many 
instances comes with ties with political and economic ramifications. In the case of the 
telecommunication industry in the Caribbean, the ability for Cable and Wireless to 
successfully negotiate monopolistic agreements has been telling. The lack of competition 
within communications, has in part discouraged a faster pace in local ICT innovation as 
well as the development of locally (regionally) competing businesses and firms. In 
addition, this research found that while telecommunications firm Cable and Wireless, has 
provided relatively up to date technologies with regard to digital network availability, the 
access costs have been very high. This has retarded the access to locals particularly in 
CARICOM states where GDP per capita is low. Internet penetration and computer 
ownership is still low. The high access costs have also been a large factor in small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) becoming more technologically competent. Though 
liberalization of the ICT sector is creating change, it has not reached the revolutionary 
impacts as expected. 
Another component of technology transfer is the transfer of knowledge and skills 
through the use of foreign nationals. While this is a process that occurs in virtually every 
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country in the Caribbean, there is a tendency to rely too heavily on foreign consultants 
and not look internally for local experts. Moreover foreign consultants are grossly 
overpaid, and their knowledge not archived or stored for further local use. Pantin noted 
this particular phenomenon with regard to the example of Trinidad's oil and gas sector. 
From the data, this research has concluded that technology transfers and 
intellectual property issues on its own is not a fundamental contributing factor in the lack 
of technology access in the Caribbean, however, it is sufficiently causal. It is a limiting 
factor in so far as the policies that CARICOM have thus created. For example the 
monopoly of foreign telecommunications company Cable and Wireless. Technology 
transfers do play a significant role in all the types of technologies developed in the 
region, however with regard to ICTs, it has only been limiting because CARICOM states 
have allowed Cable and Wireless such a long monopolistic control of the 
telecommunications market. With liberalization of the industry, new companies have 
helped reduce costs to some degree, it is expected that further demand will have the same 
effect on other telecommunications services. 
Conclusions 
The Caribbean region is unique in that its potentialities in easily harnessing the 
capabilities of ICTs are high and great. There are however severe structural issues that 
serve as constraints to this. Within the current architectonic global system, the rules 
applied to global interaction whether through the economic or the political serve the 
interest of the rich and magnify the deprivation of the poor. Digital poverty and the 
digital divide are a reflection of this system. Thus it compels states and institutions alike 
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in attempting to address this inequality to not focus primarily on the physicality of digital 
access but instead focus on what is at the crux of the access problem. In the case of the 
Caribbean four main factors serve as the main hindrances to the region's entrance to an 
information economy. The forces of neoliberal globalization, the restrictions within 
technology transfer and TRIPS agreements, the lack of focused education on technology 
innovation within a socio historical context and lastly the migration of a large groups of 
skilled and educated individuals to the developed north. The interplay of both 
endogenous and exogenous factors today have created a labyrinth of processes and 
impact that leaves the region unsure as to how to begin to address the situation at its true 
core. Ameliorative measures such as the implementation of telecentres are not sufficient. 
Unless states are willing to address the systemic causes of digital deprivation, certainly it 
will either continue and increase or replicate itself into another aspect of Caribbean life. 
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Chapter 5 - CONCLUSIONS and RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 CARICOM, the Digital Realities and Digital Possibilities 
I have argued that the digital divide is in fact a manifestation of inequalities and 
disparities that already exist within countries, regions and throughout the world. It is 
certainly not the only divide. In fact, one could possibly name hundreds of divides: a 
water divide, a food divide, a shelter divide, a healthcare divide, an education divide etc., 
with no end to the 'divides'. What all these 'divides' have in common is the very same 
source of causality. We have in place processes that have and continue to keep the world 
in a state of divides. An unfair global trading system, hegemonic power of transnational 
corporations, unequal distribution of resources, are just some of the issues that contribute 
to the 'divides', and extend far beyond a lack of access to a computer. These processes 
are systemic, and endemic to a global socio economic system that is based on the 
principles of capitalism, that has many times advanced the interests of the few, at the 
expense of the broader population. It therefore begs the question, that given the structural 
conditions that continue to perpetuate poverty at the international, regional and intra state 
level, whether the inclusion of ICTs in the poverty reduction agenda is merely treating 
the symptoms of poverty and not the actual cause. If so, focusing on ICTs for the poor, 
would act merely as a short term ameliorative tool and not a long term solution. 
What this research has found is that migration, the current inefficiencies in the 
education system, coupled with negative attitudes toward technical education, and the 
forces of neoliberal globalization all play a direct role in the Caribbean's inability to 
develop local organic processes toward creating and accessing ICT technology. 
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Technology transfer issues and intellectual property agreements with regard to ICTs 
specifically are also causal however they work in tandem with other factors and are a 
direct result of government's only partially thought out choices in policy development. 
CARICOM has stated that due to capital constraints it has had little other choices in 
technology acquisition except to rely on international telecommunications firms. These 
development issues must be addressed concurrently in order to stem the negative impact 
of one issue on the other, while maximizing the potential for future success for the 
Caribbean. 
The overall consequence of all these barriers is the inability of CARICOM to 
develop what Cline calls the socio-technical systems that form the basis of human 
innovation. Without that systematic application of science and technology, state emphasis 
on the physicality of technology can only bring about short term economic benefits as 
opposed to the future long term technology independence. Therefore the consideration 
should now be placed onto those factors which are both social and economic barriers to 
technology access. These issues as advanced by this research as massive emigration and 
education curricula development, technology transfers and the consequences of neoliberal 
globalization, should be addressed concurrent to more direct ICT focused strategy. 
Because these issues are far reaching and require extensive resources, they should be 
dealt with using a two pronged approach. 
First, CARICOM should see ICT policy as a multi development approach that 
addresses the real causes of the region's ICT "deficit", an approach that combined with 
other efforts can produce an innovative oriented society. The long term goal should 
accommodate a desire to have a society that is well adapted to technology as opposed to 
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the pursuit of technology itself. As we have mentioned, the question that CARICOM 
member states must fully acknowledge and answer is whether there is a desire to develop 
with ICTs, or focus on the development of ICTs. Therefore there should be constant, 
open and collaborative consultation in designing ICT policy and how these policies figure 
into a long term development model. 
This research concludes that of these two possible policy strategies, CARICOM 
should focus on development with ICTs, understanding that they are tools and nothing 
more. Their presence, or lack thereof, are clear indicators of the socioeconomic 
conditions within the region. Therefore, implicitly ICTs will not cause or bring about 
development, but instead are consequences of planned economic change and social 
policy. 
The second approach should be a regional one that can push the region toward a 
uniformed development strategy. CARICOM states would unnecessarily prolong 
technology development process were they to attempt to do so individually. It would be 
difficult for a state like Montserrat for example, with a population of 12,000 to gain the 
appropriate resources. Smaller states would need more time to become better financially 
equipped to make such investments. If CARICOM were to intensify its initiatives 
towards political integration, their ability to strengthen both their international presence 
and their pool of resources would be intensified. Moreover regional engagement in 
research and development, and solid investments in science and technology can also 
intensify movements toward an effective single economy. This can have a twofold impact 
of: a) one changing the nature of the Caribbean from a technology importer to a 
technology exporter (more importantly CARICOM can be less dependent on external 
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methods of technology for its own purposes), and b) further intensify the integrative 
processes by shared responsibilities and claims in the outcomes of more sophisticated 
research and development. 
The debates underlying this research, established that neoliberal globalization as 
the most dominant economic ideology has presented developing countries with an 
inability to create favorable terms of trade, or foster more equitable negotiating power. 
CARICOM in several instances has been subject to these negative influences through 
structural adjustment and WTO negotiations, both of which have severely limited the 
financial resources of Caribbean states. The severe debt in the region has made 
investments in technology difficult and under prioritised. While CARICOM cannot stop 
globalization, nor can it plausibly become a region of superpower nations, what it can do 
is anticipate that the policies from developed countries are limited in capturing the true 
essence of Caribbean reality. CARICOM should look internally for direction with their 
socio-economic goals and focus their energies on internal development as opposed to the 
dictate of external actors. 
Another aspect of this research was strictly to explore the attitudes to technical 
education and the links to colonial legacies. This plays a real impact in the local 
responses to education, despite the changes and demands on the international sphere. 
Attitudes are difficult to change; however, concerted effort, founded on dialogue with the 
private sector and education boards, as well as direct emphasis on curricular changes 
toward more science and technology, can help push students toward valuing science and 
technology studies. A programmatic approach to education has to also be integrated to a 
long term national technology goal. 
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Liberalization has presented an opportunity of increased competition which in so 
far has fostered better investments in new technologies. Undoubtedly increases in the 
quality of ICT services, can allow better business practices and foster economic growth. 
More importantly, cheaper and better services can allow Caribbean nationals easy 
accesses to telecommunications, and also allow them to develop better regional 
connections, as well as create investments from transnational connections with large 
diasporas in developed countries (this last point is said with a caveat that diasporas 
should be approached so as to exploit current opportunities without creating renewed 
cyclical opportunities or encouragement for emigration). Current technologies suggest 
that Caribbean infrastructural capacity both physically, socially and regulatory, has been 
limited by the prolonged monopoly of telecommunications company Cable and Wireless 
The guiding research question hypothesizes that ICT development polices in the 
Caribbean are severely limited by the inability of states to capture holistically the 
structural issues that impede the organic process of technology adaptation and use. The 
data suggest that currentiy the focus of ICT for development rests heavily on the physical 
structure of ICT, which does not capture the lived of reality of the Caribbean population. 
Providing information and communication technologies does not address the serious 
economic problems that have resulted from their integration into a highly inequitable 
global economy, nor does it does address low incomes, lack of education, or national 
debt. Like structural adjustment, ICT for development strategies have become a concept 
that has captured development institutions and states, without true analysis and thought to 
the cyclical reproduction of poverty. This research does not disparage a pursuit of 
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technology, but instead it contends that states should consider technology access as a long 
term goal, that cedes to human development. 
The digital divide as an economic concept highlights that the inequalities within 
and between countries, persist and replicate itself in an endless number of areas. 
Technology is simply a "new area". Though the region has created policies to close the 
divide these initiatives have not showed a move to effectively address the factors that 
lead to the inhibition of technology growth in the first place. 
Although many argue that technology demand must be market driven and not 
policy driven, it is essential to recognize that states must create an environment where 
technology demands can occur, whether it is through indirect methods such as a change 
in education. A "socio-institutional framework" for technology is more important than 
just the physical access. While technological-economic goals are important, it is the 
adaptation and internalization to growing knowledge and innovation, as well as 
recognition to the structural impediments to innovation, that will provide the base for 
appropriate development strategies, and a sustainable future for the Caribbean. 
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